Dynamic R&D Incentives with Network Externalities by Cerquera, Daniel
Dynamic R&D Incentives with
Network Externalities
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
2005
vorgelegt von
Daniel Cerquera Dussán
Referent: Prof. Stefan Mittnik, Ph.D.
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Monika Schnitzer
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 13. Juli 2005
A mis padres
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Prof. Stefan Mittnik, PhD. and Toker Doganoglu, PhD. for con-
tinuous guidance and support. Colleagues at the Center for Information and Network
Economics at the University of Munich are still a source of motivation and encourage-
ment.
I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Monika Schnitzer who agreed to be my
second supervisor and provided a very useful environment to exchange ideas through
the internal seminars at the Seminar for Comparative Economics.
This dissertation has greatly benefited from valuable comments and suggestions ob-
tained at internal seminars at the University of Munich, the conference of the European
Association of Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE, 2004) and student presen-
tations at the Kiel-Munich workshop on the Economics of Information and Network
Industries (2003, 2004).
Generous financial assistance by Volskwagen Stiftung and the Munich Graduate
School of Economics makes this research agenda possible.
Contents
Introduction i
1 R&D Incentives in Network Industries 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Second Period Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.2 First Period Investment Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Social Optimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.1 Second Period Technology Adoption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.2 First Period Investment Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 Durable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalities 25
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.1 Supply Side and R&D Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2.2 Demand Side and Expectation Formation Process . . . . . . . . 31
2.3 Market Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.1 A Monopoly Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.2 A Model with Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Social Optimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
ii
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3 Dynamic R&D Incentives with Network Externalities 56
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2.1 Supply Side and R&D Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.2.2 Demand Side and Expectation Formation Process . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.3 Product Market Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2.4 Dynamic Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2.5 Investment Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.6 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.2.7 Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.2.8 Parametrization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.1 R&D Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.2 Industry Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.3.3 Industry Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.4 Social Planner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Introduction
An industry exhibits network externalities when the benefit that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers that
use the same and/or compatible products. Prominent examples of these industries are
software, telecommunications, and consumer electronics, among others. For the firms
in those sectors, the presence of network externalities implies that the attractiveness of
their products is a function of their quality-adjusted prices and the potential benefits
attached to their expected network sizes (i.e. installed bases).1
The presence of network externalities has important consequences for the structure
of an industry. On the demand side, the presence of network externalities indicates
that any decision made by a consumer inside the industry is directly related to the
consumption decisions made by other consumers of the same industry. In other words,
consumers must form expectations about the current and future evolution of the com-
peting installed bases before acquiring a network good. Anticipating the best future
network is a key consideration because the costs associated with switching from one
network to another could be prohibitively high.
At the same time, the role of installed bases and consumers’ expectations are not
only crucial for consumer demand. Their impact may be even decisive in the mere
future of a network industry: A network technology may dominate a market only
because it is expected to do so. For example, the initial success of MS-DOS is usually
attributed not to any technical superiority, but to the fact that it was supported by
IBM. Once established, the attractiveness of MS-DOS kept increasing due to a growing
1Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986) present the seminal treat-
ments, and Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Economides (1996) present excelent surveys on network
markets.
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installed base. Thus, in contrast to traditional industries, the expectation formation
process is crucial in the evolution of network industries and their installed bases.2
In addition, the particular demand structure of network markets has important
implication on the supply side. Firms’ strategic decisions are affected because the value
of a technology is related to a network externality and the implied network benefit it
provides. In other words, a producer of a network good cannot fully control the overall
quality of the product he offers. Given that the surplus provided by a network good
is a function of the pattern of adoption exhibited in the market, firms’ strategies are
aimed at coordinating consumers’ actions in favor of their goods.
Several studies have shown how pricing considerations, as well as compatibility,
entry and investment decisions are affected by the presence of network externalities.3
For instance, Grindley (1995) states that due to the presence of network externalities,
firms in network industries follow very different rules from those observed in traditional
industries. While the producer of a new product in a conventional market tends to
place it on the market early, differentiate the good as much as possible, protect it from
imitation and charge high prices, successful producers of network goods have often
done the exact opposite.
According to Grindley (1995), casual observation of the evolution of network indus-
tries such as video cassette recorders, personal computers, digital audio standards and
high-definition television, among others, suggests that the main objective of successful
firms was to build quickly an installed base. This, in some cases, implied holding back
the product launch until all the obvious flaws were corrected, encouraging other man-
ufacturers to adopt the same standard design, and lowering prices to maximize early
sales.
2In fact, among some authors, Besen and Farrell (1994), Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Arthur
(2000) have pointed out that it is the role of consumer expectations what determines the particular
dynamics in industries with network externalities, in comparison with other industries under increasing
returns to scale. Not without reason, these particularities on the demand side have led the analysis
of network externalities to be also referred in the literature as demand scale economies, increasing
returns to adoption, network effects, network economies and positive feedback, among others.
3See, for example, Gabel (1991), Besen and Farrell (1994), Katz and Shapiro (1994), Grindley
(1995) and Shapiro and Varian (1999) for general analyses of the impact of network externalities on
firms’ strategies.
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Interestingly, all these cases shared a common feature: Because of the existence of
installed bases and the implied necessity to build and sustain such bases, competing
firms displayed an intense rivalry, along with fierce technological competition. In fact,
rapid technological progress derived from R&D competition is a common observation
in many industries with network externalities. Technological innovations allow rivalling
firms to introduce new products like interactive TV, Digital Versatile Disk (DVD), and
digital imaging. Moreover, in nascent industries, extensive investments in R&D are
usually required to introduce new standards or dominant designs.
In spite of its relevance, the economic literature on R&D and technology choice in
industries that exhibit network externalities is still in its early stage of development.
Particularly, the determinants of private innovative incentives and the conditions under
which misalignments with the social incentives arise, is an area of research that has
not received enough attention. This dissertation is a step in that direction.
Specifically, the work presented in this volume aims at contributing to two main
points identified but not fully exploited in the existing literature. First, in its great
majority, the current literature takes the process of R&D as exogenously given and
analyzes the conditions under which an innovation is adopted. Second, most of the work
devoted to the analysis of investment decisions with network externalities considers
situations where the entrant arrives with a (exogenously given) new technology, without
considering a strategic response by the incumbent to the threat of entry.4
This dissertation presents three self contained essays focused on the incentives to
carry out uncertain R&D processes in the presence of network externalities, and the
potential difference that may arise in comparison with the social optimum.
In the literature on network markets, there has been a widespread concern about
the impact of installed bases on social welfare. In particular, it has been argued that
in the presence of network externalities, it is excessively difficult for firms to enter the
market with new products or technologies that lack an installed base of past consumers.
The focus of the concern is that usually the new technology is of better quality and the
4See Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), Katz and Shapiro (1986, 1992), De Bijil and Goyal (1995),
Shy (1996), and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), among others.
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society would be better off if that technology is adopted. However, due to the presence
of an installed base, the new technology may not be adopted. This market inefficiency
has been termed in the literature as excess inertia.
Excess inertia arises because in equilibrium, the absence of an installed base may
make consumers too reluctant to adopt the new technology. For instance, old consumers
may perceive that important network benefits could be lost due to expectations of
low mass of current consumer changing to the new technology. Analogously, new
consumers may prefer to enjoy the network benefits attached to an established installed
base. In the literature, some authors have provided the theoretical rationale for this
phenomenon (Farrell and Saloner 1985, 1986).
Furthermore, the opposite inefficiency is also possible. Even if the market adopts the
new, better emerging technology, under some specific conditions overall social welfare
would be higher if consumers stay with the old one. This situation may arise when, for
instance, a considerable proportion of old consumers are not able to change technology.
Another common situation that exemplify this type of inefficiency is when an influential
consumer (i.e. a government) induces a new technology (i.e. a software) forcing other
consumers to follow suit. This inefficiency has been termed as excess momentum (or
insufficient friction) and has been repeatedly put forward in the literature (Katz and
Shapiro 1992, 1994).
Chapter 1 departs from existing literature and analyzes the efficiency of the market
outcome (i.e. whether private incentives match social ones) for the case of endogenous
and uncertain R&D processes. In particular, the main objective is to investigate under
which conditions private incentives to innovate tend to exhibit excess inertia or excess
momentum. The chapter presents a simplified two-period duopoly model of compe-
tition with uncertain technological progress, in order to determine and compare the
private and social incentives to innovate.
The chapter considers an incumbent firm with an installed base and a potential
entrant. Both firms may develop a new technology and, after the outcome of the in-
novation process is realized, compete in prices only once. The analysis is related to
previous work by Kristiansen (1996) and Choi (1994), where an incumbent and a poten-
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tial entrant must choose the risk associated with an R&D project aimed at developing
a new network good. Both papers analyze the social efficiency of the R&D projects and
conclude that the presence of network externalities imply inefficiencies. However, Choi
(1994) does not consider the case of a strategic response by the incumbent firm and
Kristiansen (1996) present opposite results compare to the ones presented in chapter
1.
The chapter presents four main results. First, for low cost of innovation entry does
not occur at all and for high cost of innovating, entry occurs with positive probability.
Low cost of innovation implies that through investments the incumbent firm is able
to preempt the entrant. Second, when entry takes place the incumbent invests always
more than the entrant and, therefore, there is a high probability that the incumbent
maintains its monopoly position. This result implies, that even though the incumbent
has an advantage to keep monopolizing the market, is being force to innovate given
the threat of entry. Third, contrary to Kristiansen (1996), from a welfare perspective
the incumbent investment level is too low and the entrant investment level is too high.
That is, the industry exhibits excess momentum. This result is due to the existence
of locked-in consumers and states that the new technology is adopted too often in
comparison to what it would be socially optimal. Finally, and fourth, the inefficiency
observed in the private outcome is solely due to the presence of network externalities.
The critical assumptions leading to the results presented in chapter 1 are that the
network goods are durable, consumers buy only once and the behavior of initial con-
sumers (i.e. installed base) is totally exogenous. In other words, initial consumers get
always locked-in and use the same good over their two periods of life. Even though
the assumption of unitary inelastic demands has been considered in almost the entire
literature on network externalities, durability and the possibility of making different
purchases are common features in network markets.5 For example, consumers of soft-
ware find optimal to upgrade their current versions even thought they are still func-
tional. The analysis of durability and repeated purchases under network externalities
5See Katz and Shapiro (1999) for an informal analysis of antitrust in software markets, where these
two characteristics, durability and technological progress are explicitly considered.
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and endogenous R&D incentives is presented in chapter 2.
The analysis of R&D incentives and durability is a complex one and it has not been
sufficiently examined in the economic literature. In essence, the problem is as follows.
R&D incentives are aimed at improving future goods, either by enhancing their quality
or by reducing their production costs. However, in the presence of durable goods, a
future better good reduces the future value of current and past produced goods. This
reduces current consumers’ willingness to pay because they foresee that in the future
their good is of lower quality (or price) in comparison to the one that will be available
in the future. Therefore, and under some conditions, without explicit commitment on
the R&D efforts, a firm may reduce its overall profits by undertaking too much R&D
initiatives.
For the case of network externalities, the durability problem has been already ana-
lyzed in the literature. However, this is not the case under endogenous R&D incentives.
Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) consider the case of the introduction of a new network
good (i.e. software) and consider explicitly the role of durability. They show that a
monopolist firm may actually face a commitment problem and introduce the new good
in cases where overall profits would be higher if the firm does not introduce it. The
reason for that result is that, by only considering period 2 profits, the monopolist does
not internalize the negative impact that introducing a new good in period 2 has on
the price charged in period 1. In their two-period model, there is only a monopolist
with an exogenously produced network good with a given quality in period 1 and the
possibility of introduce a product with better quality in period 2.
Chapter 2 presents a model that extends that of Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) by
introducing and endogenous R&D process in the production of the new technology,
and considers the role of a potential entrant. The chapter shows results not present
in the Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) analysis. In particular, the chapter considers a
two-period framework with an incumbent, a potential entrant and an inflow of new
consumers. Consumers are homogeneous and participate in a market with durable
network goods. Conditional on uncertain R&D efforts, the firms may introduce a
better network good in period 2. As in chapter 1, the analysis takes into account
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the private, as well as the social incentives to innovate in order to check the market
efficiency.
The chapter presents three main results. First, the threat of entry reverses the
commitment problem that a monopolist (without such threat) may face in its R&D
decision given the durability of the network goods. This result is not present in the
current literature and follows from the role that R&D incentives play in deterring entry.
In our case, the monopolist’s commitment problem arises only due to the presence of
network externalities.
Second, the levels of R&D determined by market outcome might differ from the
socially optimal levels. In particular, a potential entrant always over-invests (as an
entry strategy) and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, lower or equal R&D
levels in comparison with the social optimum. This result suggests that successful entry
takes place too often in comparison with the social optimum (i.e. excess momentum).
And third, the extent of network externalities is the crucial parameter in the effi-
ciency of the incumbent R&D level. In fact, it is only the presence of network exter-
nalities that permits, potentially, to the established incumbent to provide an efficient
level of innovation. Without network externalities (or very low network effects), it
is shown that the incumbent firm always under-invests in R&D efforts. This result
sheds some light on the debate whether a dominant incumbent in a network industry
provides sufficient innovation to the society.
Chapter 1 and chapter 2 present results embedded in two-period models. These
models extend the current literature by highlighting the mechanism behind the incen-
tives to pursue R&D initiatives in network industries, and are simple enough to provide
a clear intuition of their results. Chapter 3 builds on the intuition and the results of
the previous two chapters but takes the analysis one step further by considering the
evolution of a network industry in a fully dynamic setup.
Introducing dynamics is a natural step for two main reasons. First, the process of
invention and introduction of new technologies is a continuous process that benefits
from previous developments. In network industries, this is particulary important given
the rapid technological progress observed, and the associated strategic role of R&D
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investments. And second, by allowing the model to be independent of initial and
end effects, the robustness of the results in the literature can be verified and a richer
description of the incentives behind an innovation effort can be obtained.
Chapter 3 analyses the case of a dynamic duopoly model of quality competition in
the presence of network externalities. The methodology utilized adapts the Markov-
perfect equilibrium framework presented in Ericson and Pakes (1995) to track the
evolution of an industry. In particular, the model considers two firms (an established
firm and a challenger) that compete each period with two incompatible technologies
over an infinite horizon. To capture the role of the installed base, the model considers
overlapping generations of homogeneous consumers that live for two periods and make
purchases (inelastically) only once when they arrive to the market.
In order to analyze the incentives to innovate, the model considers the case of
endogenous and stochastic R&D incentives, allowing for the case of technological com-
petition outside the industry. The model is solved in two steps. In the first step,
the product market competition observed in each period is determined given suitable
assumptions. For any given quality state, the equilibrium prices and per-period prof-
its are computed as a function of the investment levels. In the second step, given
these equilibrium prices and the corresponding per-period profits, the fully dynamic
investment decision problem is stated and solved numerically using the aforementioned
approach and the computational algorithm developed in Pakes and McGuire (1994).
This methodology permits a detailed analysis of the investment behavior of the
industry. Specifically, the chapter shows four main results. First, the presence of net-
work externalities generates incentives to invest in R&D in order to innovate. This
investment levels are higher than the levels that would be observed without network
externalities. This result has three important implications: i) with a positive prob-
ability, the traditional result of ”monopolization” in one network technology can be
overcome, resembling the industry evolution of temporary monopolists; ii) the threat
of losing the market induces the established firm to follow R&D projects in order to
reduce the probability of being overtaken by the challenger; and iii) the challenger has
enough incentives to try to overtake the market.
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Second, for high network effects, a high level of outside competition implies higher
investment levels. This result implies that the relation between innovation incentives
and the level of competition is not an U-shaped function, as traditional innovation
theory for non-network industries suggests, but is a monotone increasing function.
This result says that the expectation of exhibiting future installed bases is so strong,
that even considering the case of being a technological laggard, higher investment levels
are, on expectation, worth pursuing. In addition, this result rationalizes the observed
high technological competition in network industries.
Third, the chapter shows that the market tends to over-invest in R&D in compar-
ison with the level that maximizes social surplus. In line with current literature, this
result implies that introduction of new incompatible technologies occurs too often in
equilibrium. However, the result is obtained for the case of endogenous R&D incentives
in a fully dynamic framework.
And fourth, with high competition outside the industry, the extent of network
externalities is critical in determining the size of the inefficiency associated with the
investment levels. This result shows that in the presence of high outside R&D compe-
tition, the inefficiency associated with the investment level is minimal when network
externalities are not present. As network effects become more important, the ineffi-
ciency is increased monotonically. This result permits to see a clear impact of the role
of network externalities in determining innovation incentives and the associated social
efficiency.
Chapter 1
R&D Incentives in Network
Industries
1.1 Introduction
An industry exhibits network externalities when the benefit that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers
that use the same and/or compatible products. For the firms in those sectors (e.g.
telecommunications, consumer electronics, operating systems, etc.), the presence of
network externalities implies that the attractiveness of their products is a function
of their quality-adjusted prices and the potential benefit attached to their expected
network sizes (i.e. installed bases).1
Several studies have shown how pricing considerations, as well as compatibility,
entry and investment decisions are affected by the presence of network externalities.2
Moreover, due to the presence of these externalities, firms in network industries might
even follow very different rules from those observed in traditional industries.3
1Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986) present the seminal treat-
ments, and Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Economides (1996) present excelent surveys on network
markets.
2See, for example, Gabel (1991), Besen and Farrell (1994), Katz and Shapiro (1994), Grindley
(1995) and Shapiro and Varian (1999) for general analyses of the impact of network externalities on
firms’ strategies.
3While the producer of a new product in a conventional market tends to place it on the market
early, differentiate the good as much as possible, protect it from imitation and charge high prices,
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This chapter analyzes how network externalities influence industry Research and
Development (R&D) incentives when two network technologies compete. The chapter
focuses on the levels of R&D investments, the social efficiency of those efforts and the
role of networks’ compatibility.
Rapid technological progress derived from R&D competition is a common obser-
vation in many industries with network externalities. Technological innovations allow
rivalling firms to introduce new products like interactive TV, Digital Versatile Disk
(DVD), and digital imaging. In nascent industries, extensive investments in R&D are
usually required to introduce new standards or dominant designs.
However, the literature on R&D and technology choice in industries that exhibit
network externalities is still in its early stage of development. The existing literature,
in its great majority, takes the process of R&D as exogenously given and analyzes the
conditions under which a new innovation is adopted (Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986),
Katz and Shapiro (1986, 1992), De Bijil and Goyal (1995), Shy (1996), Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000), among others). Moreover, most of the work devoted to the analysis
of adoption of new technologies with network externalities considers situations where
the entrant arrives with a (exogenously given) new technology, without considering a
strategic response by the incumbent to the threat of entry.4
This chapter proposes a simplified two-period duopoly model of competition with
uncertain technological progress, in order to determine the private incentives to invest
in R&D. The model is simple enough to be able to isolate the main forces behind the
incentives to innovate and the role of network externalities. Specifically, we consider
an incumbent firm with an installed base and a potential entrant that challenge the
incumbent only once. We assume a uncertain technological progress. In particular,
by investing in R&D before price competition takes place, each firm can influence the
probability of developing a better technology to compete with.
We also consider the social incentives to innovate and compare the results with the
market outcome. We show the conditions under which potential inefficiencies arise and
successful producers of network goods have often done the exact opposite. See Grindley (1995).
4Some exceptions that will be discussed below include Kristiansen (1996, 1998).
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propose, with our model, an explanation to these inefficiencies. Finally, we consider
the role of compatibility choice and its impact on the R&D incentives.
We present four main results. First, for low cost of innovation entry does not occur
at all and for high cost of innovation, entry occurs with positive probability. Low cost
of innovation implies that through investments the incumbent firm is able to preempt
the entrant. Second, when entry is possible, the incumbent invests always more that
the entrant and, therefore, there is a high probability that the incumbent maintains
its monopoly position. This result implies that, even though the incumbent has an
advantage to keep monopolizing the market, he is forced to innovate given the threat
of entry. Third, from a welfare perspective, the incumbent invests too little and the
entrant invests too much given the existence of locked-in consumers. These results are
solely due to the presence of network externalities and are in contrast with the results
reported in Kristiansen (1996). Fourth, by choosing to produce compatible products,
firms do not necessarily reduce the R&D competition intensity as has been suggested
for example in Katz and Ordover (1990) and Kristiansen (1998). Moreover, for high
cost of innovation compatibility may even increase the pace of innovation observed in
the industry.
Even though our model is related to the literature on network externalities, the
modelling strategy, as well as some results, differ with existing analyses. For instance,
Kristiansen (1996) also analyzes endogenous and uncertain technological process in a
network industry. He presents a model to describe how firms, an incumbent and a
potential entrant, choose among different R&D projects to develop a new incompatible
technology. In particular, he discusses the firms’ choices of R&D projects in terms of
the risk associated to each of them. To isolate the role of the riskiness of such projects,
Kristiansen (1996) assumes a mean-preserving spread criterion in the R&D technology.
That is, even though riskier projects exhibit higher returns and lower probability of
success, the expected value of all R&D projects is the same.
Particularly, he finds that from a social welfare point of view, the incumbent chooses
a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. This inefficiency arises because
of the existence of an installed base of locked-in consumers of the incumbent’s technol-
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ogy that is not taken into account when the firms decide on the R&D projects. The
entrant chooses a too low risk project because it exhibits a high probability of success
(i.e. entry) but, if successful, his R&D project provides a too low value for the society.
The incumbent chooses a too risky project because, if successful, it can extract high
consumer surplus. However, his choice does not internalize the potential welfare loss of
the locked-in consumers in the case of successful entry by a firm with an incompatible
technology.
As in Dasgupta and Maskin (1987), Kristiansen (1996) adopts the additional as-
sumption that riskier R&D projects entail unambiguously higher costs of development.
Although plausible, this assumption implies for his results that the incumbent firm
invests too much and the entrant firm too little in comparison with the social opti-
mum. We believe that in network industries the opposite phenomenon is commonly
observed. Namely, entrants usually tend to heavily (over) invest in R&D in order to
introduce new network incompatible technologies (e.g. interactive TV, Compact Disk
(CD), Digital Versatile Disk (DVD), and digital imaging). We propose a model where
this is the case. In addition, Kristiansen (1996) shows, as in our model, that the dif-
ferences between private and socially optimal R&D initiatives are due to the presence
of network externalities.
In a similar paper, Choi (1994) studies an entrant’s choice among R&D projects
with different risks in a two period model in which consumer can delay adoption. As
in Kristiansen (1996), Choi (1994) also considers the case of mean-preserving spread
criterion in the R&D technology. In his model, the quality of the incumbent technology
is constant over the two periods, while the entrant’s technology evolves stochastically.
By choosing a level of risk, the entrant firm may affect the distribution of the quality of
its good to be introduced in the second period. Two buyers enter sequentially in each
period. The first buyer can observe the R&D project (i.e. risk choice) of the potential
entrant and may decide to wait until the second period to make a purchase. Choi (1994)
concludes that the first buyer may adopt a technology too early in relation with the
social optimum. In addition, similar to Kristiansen (1996), the paper shows that the
potential entrant chooses a low level of risk in comparison with the level that maximizes
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social welfare. However, Choi (1994) does not consider the costs associated with the
selection of the R&D projects, which are an important dimension of the incentives to
innovate. We also depart from his work by considering the strategic role of the R&D
decision by the incumbent firm.
In a more recent work, Kristiansen (1998) studies the decisions of entry and com-
patibility in a duopoly market in the presence of network externalities. R&D incentives
are endogenous in the sense that an earlier entry decision imply higher costs. However,
this extra cost does not affect the probability distribution of the quality of the network
goods and represents more closely a sunk entry cost rather than a uncertain R&D in-
vestment. Kristiansen (1998) shows that when the firms choose to produce compatible
goods, it is optimal for them to introduce their goods later, and therefore compati-
bility reduces the R&D competition intensity observed by the two firms. We present
the opposite result in a model where investments in R&D do affect the probability
distribution of the quality of the network goods.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3
we analyze the market equilibrium that determines the private incentives to innovate.
In section 4 we present the socially optimal outcome and compare it with the results
of section 3. Section 4 consider the role of compatibility. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 The Model
Consider a two-period model of an industry that exhibits network externalities. In
period 1 there is an incumbent monopolist, I, that produces a network good associated
with a quality level q1. The incumbent monopolist serves the entire market in this
period and builds an installed base. Between periods 1 and 2, the incumbent can
invest in a potential innovation, which will enable him to achieve, with probability sI ,
a higher quality level q2 for the good he produces in period 2. We denote this quality
improvement as q2 − q1 = q∆ > 0. For the cases when the innovation is not achieved,
event that occurs with probability 1−sI , the incumbent produces in period 2 the same
good it produced in period 1. The cost of this investment increases with the probability
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of achieving the innovation and is assumed to be quadratic and given by ks2I/2.
Furthermore, we introduce a potential entrant, E, who can also invest in innovation
and enter the market with a network good in period 2. As the incumbent, the cost
of the investment for the entrant is given by ks2E/2, where sE is the probability that
the entrant develops the innovation and enters the market with a good of quality q2.
It is assumed that in the case that the entrant does not achieve the innovation, event
that occurs with probability 1 − sE, it is able to ”copy” the technology used by the
incumbent in period 1. For simplicity, it is assumed that the problem of both firms
reduces to choose the probability sI and sE that the innovation is achieved in period
2.
On the demand side, it is assumed that each period a group of homogeneous con-
sumer of size 1 arrives in the market. Given consumer homogeneity, we can assume
without loss of generality that in each period only one consumer arrives in the market.
In the model, each consumer exhibit an inelastic demand for a single unit of a network
good and purchases as soon as he arrives in the market. There is no discounting. In
particular, the per-period utility that a consumer derives from a network good is given
by q + bx where q is the quality of the good (i.e. stand-alone value), and b is the extent
of the network benefit attached to the good given that the number of consumers buying
the same (or a compatible) good is x.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of period 1, the incumbent
produces a network good with quality q1, sets a price and the first consumer buys.
Between periods 1 and 2, the incumbent invests in order to improve its good. At the
same time, a potential entrant invests in order to enter the market with an improved
good. At the beginning of period 2, the outcome of the innovation is realized, price
competition takes place, the new consumer arrives in the market and decides on its
preferred good.
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1.3 Market Equilibrium
In order to characterize the subgame-perfect equilibria in this game we proceed back-
wards. We start with the pricing and consumption decision in period 2.
1.3.1 Second Period Sales
In the second period firms decide on the price they charge, and the second consumer
decides on the good he prefers. However, these two decisions are affected by first
period purchases and the outcome of the innovation process. Recall that in period 1
the incumbent firm monopolizes the market and is able to serve it completely. The
evolution of the first period is assumed exogenous. Therefore, an installed base of
size 1 is built and carried into the second period. Regarding the innovation process,
we distinguish among four cases; B denotes the case in which both firms innovate; I
and E denote the cases in which only the incumbent or only the entrant innovates,
respectively; and N denotes the history in which no firm innovates. We define four
subgames ΓB, ΓI , ΓE and ΓN for each case, respectively.
In subgame ΓB, both firm innovate and therefore are able to enter the market with
a good of quality q2. However, given the existence of an installed base, firms compete
in a quality differentiated duopoly. It is further assumed that consumers are able to
coordinate on the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Therefore, they compare the maximum
surplus that can be obtained from each technology and decide accordingly.5 Thus, the
benefit gross of price provided by the incumbent is equal to q2 +2b, and equal to q2 + b
for the entrant. Bertrand competition implies that the incumbent’s price is equal to
pI = b and sells to the second consumer, while the entrant’s price equals pE = 0 and
does not enter the market.
In subgame ΓI , the incumbent firm innovates and sells a good of quality q2 offering
a gross benefit of q2 + 2b, while the entrant provides a surplus of q1 + b. Again,
Bertrand competition implies an incumbent’s price of pI = q∆ + b and sells to the
second consumer, while the entrant’s price equals pE = 0 and does not enter the
5See Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Farrell and Katz (2005).
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market.
In subgame ΓE, the entrant firm is the only innovator and sells a good of quality q2
offering a gross benefit of q2 + b, while the incumbent provides a surplus of q1 + 2b. In
this subgame, entry takes place whenever q∆ > b. In that case, Bertrand competition
implies an entrant’s price of pE = q∆ − b and sells to the second consumer, while the
incumbent’s price equals pI = 0.
In subgame ΓN , no firm innovates and both offer a good of quality q1. However,
the incumbent exhibits an installed base advantage and provides a surplus equal to
q1 + 2b, compared to q1 + b from the entrant. Bertrand competition implies that
the incumbent’s price is equal to pI = b and sells to the second consumer, while the
entrant’s price equals pE = 0 and does not enter the market.
Assumption 1 The value of the innovation is greater than the value of the installed
base. q∆ > b.
This assumption gives the opportunity to the entrant to enter the market. That
is, the value of the innovation should be able to more than compensate the network
benefits provided by the incumbent firm and drives the result presented for subgame
ΓE.
We can summarize the outcome of second period price competition in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Given assumption 1, each second period subgame-perfect price equi-
librium is unique. No entry takes place in subgames ΓB, ΓI , ΓN , while the entrant
overtakes the market in subgame ΓE. Equilibrium prices are given as follows:
i. In subgames ΓB and ΓN , pI = b and pE = 0.
ii. In subgame ΓI , pI = b + q∆ and pE = 0.
iii. In subgame ΓE, pI = 0 and pE = q∆ − b.
Proposition 1 implies that entry only occur when subgame ΓE is realized. That
is, the only opportunity for the entrant to enter the market is when it achieves the
innovation and the incumbent does not.
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1.3.2 First Period Investment Decisions
Given the above analysis of the period 2 play, we now solve for the subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the entire game considering the optimal investment behavior of both
firms.
The profit function of the incumbent is therefore given by,
max
sI
sIsEb + sI(1− sE)(b + q∆) + (1− sI)(1− sE)b− ks2I/2, (1.1)
where k is a cost parameter.
Analogously, and following the analysis of the period 2 price competition, the profit
function of the entrant is therefore given by,
max
sE
(1− sI)sE(q∆ − b)− ks2E/2 (1.2)
The first-order conditions for an interior solution are given by,
q∆ − sE(q∆ − b)− ks∗I = 0, (1.3)
for the incumbent firm, and,
(1− sI)(q∆ − b)− ks∗E = 0, (1.4)
for the entrant firm. Note that whenever the probabilities sI and sE are in the
interval (0, 1), the second-order conditions are always less than zero and the invest-
ment strategies exhibit strategic substitutability. Therefore, we can find the optimal
equilibrium levels by solving simultaneously equations (1.3) and (1.4) for the values of
sI and sE. That is, the optimal investment levels are given by,
s∗I = 1−
k(q∆ − k)
(q∆ + k − b)(q∆ − k − b)
(1.5)
s∗E =
(q∆ − b)(q∆ − k)
(q∆ + k − b)(q∆ − k − b)
(1.6)
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We can show the following results.
Proposition 2 Given assumption 1.
i. For k > q∆ there are unique values of s
∗
I and s
∗
E such that 0 < s
∗
I < 1 and
0 < s∗E < 1. s
∗
I > s
∗
E always holds.
ii. For k ≤ q∆ the equilibrium levels of investment are unique and equal to s∗I = 1
and s∗E = 0.
Proof. Numeral [i.] follows from equations (1.5) and (1.6). Numeral [ii.] requires to
check the first-order conditions (i.e. equations (1.3) and (1.4)) and it can be seen that
k ≤ q∆ implies a corner solution.
Numeral [i.] of proposition 2 implies that entry occurs with positive probability
(i.e (1 − s∗I)s∗E) when the cost of innovating, k, is relatively high. The intuition for
this result is that for moderate costs of innovation, the incentives for the incumbent to
innovate are high and therefore achieves the innovation with a high probability. Given
that the entrant can only enter the market when the incumbent does not innovate,
the entrant has lower incentives to innovate. As the cost of the innovation increases,
the incumbent reduces his incentives to innovate and, hence, it is, in expectations,
profitable for the entrant to keep investing. However, the installed base advantage of
the incumbent limits the incentives to innovate for the entrant.
Numeral [ii.] of proposition 2 states that when the cost of innovation is too low
no entry occurs. That is, the incumbent invests its maximum possible amount s∗I = 1
and the entrant has no incentives to innovate and exhibit an investment level equal to
s∗E = 0.
These result of proposition 2 can be seen graphically. Figure 1.1 shows the equi-
librium values s∗I and s
∗
E. For simplicity, this figure considers the case when b = 1 and
q∆ = 3 but extends to any parameter configuration, such that the assumptions of the
model hold.
Note in the graph the case when the cost of investment are zero or close to zero
(i.e. no entry equilibrium due to k ≤ q∆). In that situation, the incentives to invest for
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Figure 1.1: Market Outcome - Investment Levels
the incumbent are at its maximum (sI = 1) because investing that amount implies the
achievement of an innovation in the next period at a low cost, and therefore, securing
its incumbent position. Conversely, the incentives to invest for the entrant are zero,
even though investment is low or even costless. The reason is, no matter how much
the entrant invests (even sE = 1), the entrant is never going to takeover the market.
Therefore, for costless investment the incumbent firm invests the maximum possible
and the entrant firm performs no investment.
However, when the cost of investment starts increasing, it is extremely costly for
the incumbent to carry out exactly the maximum possible investment. Therefore, it
reduces slightly its level of investment, reducing at the same time its probability of suc-
cess. As a consequence, now that the incumbent is not achieving the innovation with
certainty, there is a room for the entrant to invest and, possibly, takeover the market.
For low cost of investment and given that the entrant starts with no investment, the
increasing possibility of overtaking the market, when the cost of investment increases,
implies that the entrant also increases its investment level in order to take advantage
of such opportunity. Nevertheless, as the cost of the innovation increases, the entrant
cannot increase its investment level indefinitely because at some point investment ef-
forts become too expensive. After that point, the investment level of the entrant firm
must decrease on the cost of such investments. Note that it is always the case that
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s∗I > s
∗
E.
This divergence in the investment levels of the two firms only arises because of
the installed base that the incumbent built in period 1. Therefore, the extent of the
network benefit is critical to this result and explains the asymmetric investment levels
observed in equilibrium. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under assumption 1 assume that the network externalities increase
(i.e. b increases). In equilibrium,
i. The incumbent invests more in R&D.
ii. The entrant invests less in R&D.
Proof. Consider the derivative of equations (1.5) and (1.6) with respect to the network
externalities parameter.
This proposition says that the presence of network externalities increases the incen-
tives to innovate for the firm that exhibits the installed base. That is, the presence of
locked-in consumers implies that successful improvements in the good offered can be
profitable. On the other hand, the presences of installed bases reduces the incentives
for the entrant firm due to the strategic substitutability with respect to the incumbent’s
investment level. This result is in contrast with those reported by Kristiansen (1996)
in his proposition 2, where higher network benefits imply lower (higher) incumbent’s
(entrant’s) incentives to innovate. One reason for this discrepancy, is due to the fact
that the focus of his paper is on the riskiness associated to the R&D projects under-
taken by the firms, and therefore, it implies a different modelling strategy as explained
in the introduction.
The previous results can be seen in Figure 1.2. This figure shows that for b = 0 both
firms exhibit the same incentives to innovate and the size of the difference depends on
the extent of the network externalities. It can be shown that the level of R&D when
b = 0 is symmetric and equal to q∆/(q∆ +k). As b increases, the incentives to innovate
behave according to proposition 3.
In addition, the incentives to innovate are also affected by the size of the expected
innovation. This result is presented in the following proposition.
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Figure 1.2: Investment Levels and Network Externalities
Proposition 4 Assume that the value of the potential innovation increases (i.e. q∆
increases). In equilibrium,
i. The incumbent invests more in R&D.
ii. For low innovation costs the entrant invests less in R&D and the opposite occurs
for moderate and high innovation costs.
Proof. Consider the derivative of equations (1.5) and (1.6) with respect to q∆.
Figure 1.3 shows that for moderate and high cost of the innovation, a higher size of
the innovation tends to increase the incentives to innovate for both firms. This follows
from the higher expected returns that can be made in the future if the installed base
is increased (or captured) in period 2. This result is in line with the literature on the
incentives to innovate, namely, a higher expected value of being the innovator increases
the willingness to pay for the innovation.6 In contrast, for low cost of innovation, a
higher size of the innovation may reduce the incentives to innovate of the entrant firm.
The intuition of this result is similar to the one presented for proposition 2. That is,
when the cost of innovating is low, an increase in the size of the innovation increases
the innovation incentives for the incumbent firm. This could lead the incumbent firm
to carry out an investment level that is close to the maximum possible, hence, reducing
6See Reinganum (1989).
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Figure 1.3: Investment Levels and Size of Innovation
the expected value of the innovation for the entrant and, in consequence, its innovation
incentives.
One important question corresponds to the efficiency of the previous results. This
analysis is taken into account in the next section.
1.4 Social Optimum
In order to analyze the efficiency of the market outcome presented above, this section
analyzes the socially optimal outcome. We try to find out what are the differences in
the privately determined investment behavior for the incumbent and the entrant firm
and what is the role of network externalities in the potential inefficiencies. We first
assume that in the second period adoption can be induced by a central planner. Thus,
given the outcome of the innovation process, we are able to determine the network good
that provide the higher surplus from a social perspective. Next, once we know which
network good is going to be induced, we analyze the social incentives to undertake
innovative initiatives. We consider the case where the following assumption holds.
Assumption 2 The value of the innovation is greater than the value of the installed
base of the old and new consumers. q∆ > 2b.
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This assumption is required to consider situations where it is socially optimal to
introduce a new technology that is incompatible with the existing installed base.
1.4.1 Second Period Technology Adoption
We consider the maximum surplus that consumers can achieved in the second period
given the four possible subgames (i.e. ΓB, ΓI , ΓE and ΓN). We take into account
the surplus of the first consumer that is locked-in with the incumbent’s good, and the
surplus of the consumer that arrives in the second period.
In subgame ΓB, the social surplus provided by the incumbent’s good is equal to
q1 +2b and q2 +2b for the first and second period consumer, respectively. This provides
a total social surplus of q2 + q1 + 4b in the second period if the network good of the
incumbent firm is adopted. Analogously, the entrant’s good provides a surplus equal to
q1 +b and q2 +b for the first and second period consumer, respectively. The total social
surplus from the entrant’s good is q2 + q1 + 2b. Clearly, due to the role of the installed
base, the incumbent’s good provides a higher overall social surplus and therefore is
adopted in the case subgame ΓB is realized.
Following a similar analysis, we can show that in subgames ΓI and ΓN the incum-
bent’s technology is induced with total surplus equal to q2 + q1 + 4b and 2q1 + 4b,
respectively.
Given assumption 2, in the case that subgame ΓE is realized in the second period, it
is socially optimal to induce the entrant’s technology in the second period. Specifically,
the entrant’s good provides a total surplus of q2 + q1 + 2b.
Given the optimal choices of the central planner in the second period in terms of
adoption, now we are able to calculate the socially optimal investment behavior. This
is calculated in the next subsection.
1.4.2 First Period Investment Decisions
The central planner’s objective function considered in the first period, given the optimal
choice that is going to be observed in the second period once the innovation process is
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realized, is given by,
max
sI ,sE
sIsE(q2 + q1 + 4b) + sI(1− sE)(q2 + q1 + 4b)
+ (1− sI)sE(q2 + q1 + 2b) + (1− sI)(1− sE)(2q1 + 4b)
− ks2I/2− ks2E/2
In order to express the results in a comparable way with respect to the analysis
presented for the market outcome, it can be shown that adding and substracting q1,
the problem of the social planner can be written as,
max
sI ,sE
sIsE(4b + q∆) + sI(1− sE)(4b + q∆)
+ (1− sI)sE(2b + q∆) + 4b(1− sI)(1− sE)
+ 2q1 − ks2I/2− ks2E/2
(1.7)
In consequence, the first-order conditions are given by,
q∆ − sE(q∆ − 2b)− ksSOI = 0, (1.8)
for the incumbent technology, and,
(1− sI)(q∆ − 2b)− ksSOE = 0, (1.9)
for the entrant technology.
As in the case for the market outcome, whenever the probabilities sI and sE are in
the interval (0, 1), the second-order conditions are always less than zero. Therefore, we
can find the social optimal levels by solving simultaneously equations (1.8) and (1.9)
for the values of sSOI and s
SO
E . That is, the social optimal investment levels are given
by,
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sSOI = 1−
k(q∆ − k)
(q∆ + k − 2b)(q∆ − k − 2b)
(1.10)
sSOE =
(q∆ − 2b)(q∆ − k)
(q∆ + k − 2b)(q∆ − k − 2b)
(1.11)
We can show the following results.
Proposition 5 Without network externalities (b = 0) the social optimum and the
market outcome are identical
Proof. Comparing equations (1.5) and (1.6) for the market outcome and equations
(1.10) and (1.11) for the social optimum, it can be seen that for b = 0 there is no
inefficiency for any of the firms.
The result in proposition 5 permits us to isolate the impact of network externalities
in the inefficiencies that may arise in the incentives to innovate for both firms.
In addition, by comparing the optimal levels of innovation with the levels achieved
privately, we can state the following result.
Proposition 6 In comparison with the social optimum,
i. The incumbent exhibits a too low level of investment.
ii. The entrant exhibits a too high level of investment.
Proof. It follows from comparing equations (1.5) and (1.6) for the market outcome
and equations (1.10) and (1.11) for the social optimum for cases where b > 0.
This result states that even though the incumbent has increased incentives to inno-
vate given the presence of network externalities, those greater incentives are insufficient
from a welfare perspective. The reason for this results comes from the fact that in the
market outcome, the private incentives of the incumbent do not consider the potential
loss that the first consumer can incur given that is locked-in. This result is presented
in Figure 1.4.
For the case of the entrant, this result implies that, given that he can capture the
market (i.e. make profits) only if he is the unique innovator, he would over-invest in
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Figure 1.4: Social Optimum - Investment Levels
R&D. In this way, the entrant firm maximizes the probability of successful innovation
in a socially inefficient way (i.e. rent dissipation). As stated in the introduction, Kris-
tiansen (1996) presents the opposite result. That is, a potential entrant under-invests
in R&D because he opts for a too certain R&D project, maximizing the probability of
successful innovation. Therefore, even though the intuition in both cases is similar, the
implications for R&D expenditures are the exact opposite and arise from the modelling
strategy. We believe that in Kristiansen (1996), the assumed mean-preserving spread
criterion, although it allows an analysis of R&D risk, it leads to a unrealistic prediction.
In network industries entrants usually tend to heavily (over) invest in R&D in order to
introduce new network incompatible technologies (e.g. interactive TV, Compact Disk
(CD), Digital Versatile Disk (DVD), and digital imaging).7
The main implication of the results regarding the social efficiency of the market
outcome is that, in equilibrium, the new incompatible technology (i.e. the entrant’s
network good) tend to be adopted too often. Kristiansen (1996) presents the same
result. In his paper, entry occurs too often because the entrant chooses a too certain
R&D project, implying a high rate of success and a too low level of investments. In the
present model, entry occurs too often because the entrant invests too much in R&D
7Choi (1994) also presents a model where a potential entrant chooses a too certain R&D project in
order to maximize the expected network size. However, Choi (1994) does not consider the implications
for R&D expenditures that are the focus of the present chapter.
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and captures the market too frequently. Therefore, even though his market outcome
results differ from the ones presented here (i.e. he predicts an entrant’s inefficient
under-investment level), the consequences for social welfare are similar.
These results highlight the importance of an empirical analysis aimed at disentangle
the true mechanism behind R&D incentives and the pattern of adoption of network
goods. This is particularly relevant for the design of public policy. For instance, public
policies that increase the incentives to innovate for entrant firms (i.e. tax exemptions,
R&D subsidies, patents’ design, etc.) will imply opposite effects for social welfare. In
Kristiansen (1996), such policies will be welfare-enhancing because they will allow an
entrant firm to choose a riskier project, invest more and reduce the inefficiently high
entry rate. In the present setup, such policies will be welfare-reducing because they
will increase the loss due to the rent dissipation in the R&D competition stage and
will exacerbate the already too high rate of entry.
1.5 Compatibility
The last two sections dealt with the case when the two firms produce incompatible
network goods. However, a common observation is the growing number of alliances
in information-technology industries in order to attempt to determine common design
features in emerging markets. Sometimes the alliances take the form of compatibility
agreements (e.g. sharing technologies) in order to maximize network effects.
For instance, a consortium of electronics and computing companies working on
DVD development are attempting to agree on common standards to try to avoid the
VHS/Beta standards battle. IBM decided to open its PC architecture and Nokia
announced that it would share its mobile technology with other firms.
At the same time, in some recent cases like the video game industry and the intro-
duction of digital TV, it has been clear that competition takes place with incompatible
standards. Moreover, there is no clear answer under which conditions industry compe-
tition favors compatibility or incompatibility. For instance, Phillips and Sony agreed
on a Compact Disk (CD) standard but are now entering a contest to determine the
Chapter 1 R&D Incentives in Network Industries 20
new digital audio format.8
This section provides an illustration of the role of compatibility in a network market
and its impact on the incentives to perform R&D investments. In the setup presented
in this chapter, full compatibility implies that each group of consumers benefit from
the total network effects. That is, additional to the stand-alone value of the network
good, the value of the network benefits is common to all consumers and equal to 4b.
Therefore, in the price competition stage the network benefits provide no advantage to
any firm and the first period R&D market equilibrium is identical to the case without
network effects with optimal investments in R&D symmetric and equal to q∆/(q∆ + k)
(i.e. a price-quality competition determined by a R&D race).9
However, what makes the present analysis different to a regular R&D race under
quality differentiation is the impact on consumer surplus. That is, the network benefits
do not affect the outcome of firms’ competition and the social planner but do influence
the final surplus enjoyed by consumers. By solving the problem under compatibility it
can be shown that even though industry profits are always higher under incompatibility,
a social planner would always impose a compatibility agreement.
Moreover, under compatibility, private R&D incentives are not only symmetric but
efficient. This result is not surprising because compatibility implies that the network
benefits are common to all groups of consumers, and this fact is known by private
firms, as well as by the social planner.
However, note that this compatibility-led efficiency implies that the incumbent
firm invests less and the entrant invests more than the levels that would be observed
under incompatibility. Therefore, as the net effect depends on parameters’ values,
compatibility does not necessarily reduces the intensity of the R&D competition as has
been suggested for example by Katz and Ordover (1990) and Kristiansen (1998). In
consequence, it can be stated that compatibility per se does not reduce the pace of
innovation in a network industry.10
8See Reilly (1993) and Besen and Farrell (1994).
9Under compatibility, the firms’ problem is defined by maxsi si(1 − sj)(q∆) − ks2i /2 where i, j ∈
{I, E} and i 6= j. The social planner problem is equal to maxsI ,sE sIsE(q∆) + sI(1− sE)(q∆) + (1−
sI)sE(q∆) + (1− sI)(1− sE) + 4b + 2q1 − ks2I/2− ks2E/2.
10In the 70’s, the US National Bureau of Standards refused to write interface standards for the
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Figure 1.5: Innovation Pace
The reason for this, is the presence of endogenous and uncertain quality differentia-
tion. In Kristiansen (1998) the only source of differentiation (in expectations) between
the incumbent and the potential entrant is the presence of an installed base. Therefore,
compatibility eliminates all possible source of advantages for the competing firms, while
in our case differentiation can still be achieve through successful R&D initiatives.11
In our model, it can be shown that for high costs of innovation, compatibility actu-
ally increases the R&D competition intensity, evidencing a higher pace of innovation.
Defining the pace of innovation as the probability of observing a quality improvement
in any of the offered goods (i.e. 1−x where x is the probability that no firm innovates),
Figure 1.5 shows this result.
1.6 Conclusions
In the present chapter, we have presented a simplified two-period duopoly model of
competition with uncertain technological progress in order to determine the private
incentives to innovate and its relation with the social incentives.
We have presented four main results. First, for low cost of innovation entry does not
computer industry claiming that standards would retard innovation. See Hemenway (1975).
11Farrell and Katz (1998) also argue that R&D competition with uncertain outcomes tends to create
winners and losers. Winners prefer incompatibility.
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occur at all and for high cost of innovating, entry occurs with positive probability. This
result highlights the preemptive power of the innovation incentives. That is, for low
cost of innovation the incumbent firm may increase enough the probability of achieving
the innovation, eliminating the entrant’s incentives to attempt to capture the market.
Second, when entry is possible, the incumbent invests always more that the entrant
and, therefore, there is a high probability the the incumbent maintains its monopoly
position. This result implies, that even though the incumbent has an advantage to
keep monopolizing the market, he is forced to innovate given the threat of entry.
Third, from a welfare perspective, the incumbent invests too little and the entrant
invests too much given the existence of locked-in consumers. That is, neither the
incumbent firm nor the entrant takes into account the impact on welfare of the first
period consumers and this generates the social suboptimal outcome. These efficiency
results are solely due to the presence of network externalities.
Finally, fourth, by choosing to produce compatible products, firms do not neces-
sarily reduce the R&D competition intensity as has been argued for example in Katz
and Ordover (1990) and Kristiansen (1998). This is due to the presence of endoge-
nous quality differentiation. Moreover, compatibility is always preferred from a social
welfare perspective and for high cost of innovation it may even increase the pace of
innovation observed in the industry.
It should be recognized that the model might, and should, be extended to a fully
dynamic setting and must consider a richer set of options for the involved firms. In
addition, comparison with case studies or empirical regularities might enrich the results.
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Chapter 2
Durable Goods, Innovation and
Network Externalities
2.1 Introduction
An industry exhibits network externalities when the benefit that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers that
use the same and/or compatible products. For the firms in those sectors (e.g. software,
telecommunications, consumer electronics, etc.), the presence of network externalities
implies that the attractiveness of their products is a function of their quality-adjusted
prices and the potential benefit attached to their expected network sizes (i.e. installed
bases).1
Those products (i.e. network goods) tend to be characterized by two features closely
related. Durability and rapid technological progress.2 Durability implies that network
goods tend to ”wear out” not as a result of physical deterioration, but as a consequence
of technical obsolescence; a feature due to technological progress. For example, a given
software (or mobile phone, or video game, etc.) can be functional for a long time.
However, the utility derived by its use tend to be dissipated due to new (and actually
1See Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrel and Saloner (1985, 1986) for seminal treatments,
and Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Economides (1996) for surveys on network markets.
2See Katz and Shapiro (1999) for an informal analysis of antitrust in software markets, where these
two characteristics are explicitly considered.
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very frequent) developments that are more closely related to consumers needs and
tastes.
This chapter considers a stylized network industry where these two feature, dura-
bility and technological progress, are analyzed together. In particular, we propose a
model of R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential entrant and consider
the implications of the durability of network goods. Our main objective, is to isolate
the role of network externalities and analyze the social efficiency of the R&D incentives
of the firms in this industry.
We depart from the current literature by considering, simultaneously, an oligopolis-
tic setup, endogenous R&D processes and durable goods. Therefore, this chapter is
not only closely related to the literature on durable goods and to the literature on
technological progress in network industries, but represents a first step in bridge them
together.
The economic literature has highlighted the role that durability plays in the evolu-
tion of a market dominated by a monopolist. In particular, the conventional problem
for the monopolist is that, having sold a durable good, there is an incentive to reduce
price later to bring into the market those consumers that would not pay the initial high
price. However, consumers realize that the monopolist has such an incentive to reduce
price once they have purchased and those that value the good less highly will withhold
their purchase until price falls. For this reason the monopolist is unable to extract
as much money from the market as would be possible with a pre-commitment of ”no
future price reductions”. The fact that in the absence of commitment the monopo-
list may act against his own profitability implies a ”time-inconsistency” problem (i.e.
choices that maximize current profitability might not maximize overall profitability).
This notion was first discussed by Coase (1972) and has been labelled as the ”Coase
Conjecture”.3 Since its formulation, the Coase Conjecture has been theoretically de-
veloped in several papers that consider the robustness of the basic observation.4
3Strictly, the Coase Conjecture refers to a limiting case. It states that in the absence of commitment
and if the monopolist may adjust its prices frequently enough, the successive price reductions lead to
marginal cost pricing and the subsequent loss of market power.
4See, for example, Bagnoli, Salant and Swierzbinski (1989), Bulow (1982), Gul, Sonnenschein and
Wilson (1986), and Stokey (1981).
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The essential problem is that the monopolist’s actions in the future provide com-
petition for the company in the present market.5 If the monopolist is able to lease
the good, distort technology or implement buy back procedures then more profit can
be extracted from the market since these strategies restrict the aftermarket.6 Failing
this the monopolist has an incentive to reduce durability or make the good obsolete
after a period of time.7 The existing analysis of durability in the presence of network
externalities has intended, as the main literature on durability, to verify the validity of
the Coase Conjecture.8
However, the implications of durability are much broader than the pricing com-
mitment problem considered in the analysis of the Coase Conjecture. In particular,
the result that a monopolist in the absence of commitment may affect its own overall
profitability applies in several contexts. In fact, as pointed out by Waldman (2003),
any present and future action that affects the future (relative) value of the monopo-
list’s used goods might be subject to the ”time-inconsistency” described above. One
leading case of such actions is a firm’s R&D expenditures which, by definition, affect
the (relative) value of used (or previously sold) goods.9
In the presence of network externalities, the similar analysis of introduction of new
durable goods has been analyzed.10 However, this literature is focused on a monopolis-
tic setup and considers the production of new technologies as exogenous. Hence, and
to the best of our knowledge, there is no analysis that consider explicitly the process of
endogenous R&D processes in the presence of network externalities and durable goods.
This chapter attempts to be a small step in that direction. As has been repeat-
edly highlighted in the literature, network goods are durable (e.g. consumer electron-
ics, PCs, software) and their economic obsolescence follows from rapid technological
progress instead of physical deterioration, implying the leading role of R&D incentives.
5The price of a durable good attempts to extract current and future surplus, however, future
surplus depends on future actions that are not realized when the price is set.
6See Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), Kahn (1986) and Waldman (1997).
7See Bulow (1986), Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), Rust (1986) and Waldman (1993), Grout and Park
(2005).
8See Bensaid and Lesne (1996), Cabral et al. (1999) and Mason (2000).
9See Waldman (1996), Fishman and Rob (2000) and Nahm (2004).
10See Choi (1994) and Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
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Moreover, even though network industries are characterized by a few number of suc-
cessful incumbents (sometimes only one), entry does take place, making an oligopolistic
analysis of R&D incentives with durable goods relevant.
The paper presented by Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) is the closest to this chapter
and is actually our departure point. In that paper, the authors consider a monopoly
that operates in a two-period framework and produces durable network goods. In the
first period the monopoly produces a good with a given low quality and, subsequently,
has the choice of introducing an improved version in the second period. Network
externalities play a role because the improvement of the old good implies backward
compatibility. That is, consumers of the new good enjoy network benefits from the
entire population, while consumers of the old good only enjoy network benefits from
consumers of the same good.11
In their model, there is an inflow of new consumers in the second period and,
with consumer homogeneity, the paper shows that the monopolist has the incentive to
introduce the improved good, even though the monopolist’s overall profits (and social
surplus) is reduced. That is, in the absence of commitment the monopolist’s choice
that maximizes current (second period) profits does not maximize overall profitability.
We present a model that extends that of Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) by intro-
ducing and endogenous R&D process in the production of the new technology, and
consider the role of a potential entrant. We show results not present in the Ellison and
Fudenberg (2000) analysis. In particular, we consider a two-period framework with
an incumbent, a potential entrant and an inflow of new consumers. Consumers are
homogeneous and participate in a market with durable network goods.
In the first period, there is a first group of consumers that buy a network good
from the established incumbent. Before the second period starts, a potential entrant
appears in the market and, jointly with the incumbent, decides on an investment level
that will allow him to compete in the second period. This R&D process is stochastic.
By investing a certain amount, both firm determine the probability that in the second
11A case of this situation was evidenced by the launch of Microsoft Word 97. Consumers of Word97
were fully compatible with consumers of Word95 but the opposite did not hold.
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period they are able to produce a new product that is quality-improved relative to the
existing good produced by the incumbent. Conditional on the success or failure of the
innovation process, both firms compete in price in the second period when a new group
of consumers arrive.
We analyze the incentives to innovate for both firms, we compare it to the social
optimum and investigate the role of the network externalities. With our simplified
approach, we are able to isolate the impact of network externalities and reach three
main results.
First, the threat of entry reverses the commitment problem that a monopolist
(without such threat) may face in its R&D decision given good durability. This result
is not present in the current literature and follows from the role that R&D incentives
play in deterring entry. In our case, the monopolist’s commitment problem arises only
due to the presence of network externalities.
Second, the levels of R&D determined by market outcome might differ from the
socially optimal levels. In particular, a potential entrant always over-invests (as an
entry strategy) and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, lower or equal R&D
levels in comparison with the social optimum. This result suggests that successful entry
takes place too often in comparison with the social optimum.
And third, the extent of network externalities is the crucial parameter in the effi-
ciency of the incumbent R&D level. In fact, it is only the presence of network exter-
nalities that permits, potentially, to the established incumbent to provide an efficient
level of innovation. Without network externalities (or very low network effects), it
is shown that the incumbent firm always under-invests in R&D efforts. This result
sheds some light on the debate whether a dominant incumbent in a network industry
provides sufficient innovation to the society.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
3 presents the analysis of its equilibrium. Section 4 computes the social optimum and
compares it with the results of the market outcome. Finally, section 5 concludes and
discusses some areas of further research.
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2.2 The Model
We consider a model of a network industry with durable goods based on that of Ellison
and Fudenberg (2000).12 There are two periods denoted by t = 1 and t = 2 with
a group of homogeneous consumers arriving in each period. In period 1 there is a
monopolist incumbent that is challenged in period 2 by a potential entrant. In period
2, firms compete in prices with quality differentiated products. Quality is determined
through endogenous and stochastic R&D processes carried out in period 1.
2.2.1 Supply Side and R&D Process
In period 1, an incumbent monopolist, I, produces a durable network good with quality
level q1 (i.e. stand-alone value). The good lasts two periods after which it vanishes.
We consider the case of product innovations where, subject to R&D expenditures, the
incumbent might be able to produce a network good of better quality to be introduced
in period 2. In our model, this process of innovation is carried out at the end of period
1. In addition, we assume that the outcome of the R&D process is stochastic with
two possible outcomes, success or failure. This outcome is realized at the beginning of
period 2.
In particular, we consider an R&D process where the incumbent firm determines
the probability sI that the innovation process is successful. Higher investments (i.e.
higher probability of success) entail higher costs. These costs are summarized by means
of a function C(sI) that is increasing in the probability of success sI . For simplicity,
we assume that C(sI) =
as2I
2
, where a is a cost parameter.
In the case of success, the innovation is achieved and allows the incumbent firm to
produce a ”new” network good with quality q2 in period 2, where q2 = q1 + q∆ and q∆
is the extent of the innovation. q∆ is assumed to be constant and greater than zero.
If the innovation process is unsuccessful, the incumbent produces in period 2 the same
”old” good with low quality q1. It is assumed that the achievement of the innovation
12We construct our model to make Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) a particular case of the one
presented here.
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do not preclude the incumbent to produce the ”old” good in period 2.
In addition, we introduce a potential entrant, E, that intends to compete with the
incumbent in period 2. In order to be able to enter the market, the potential entrant
must invest in R&D to develop a network good. The entrant’s innovation process
takes place simultaneously with that of the incumbent firm. It is assumed, that the
innovation process for the potential entrant is identical to the one of the incumbent
firm. Therefore, the potential entrant must determine the probability sE, that its
innovation process succeeds. If so, the entrant is able to produce the ”new” good with
quality q2 in period 2. It is assumed that in the case of unsuccessful innovation, the
entrant firm stays out of the market (i.e. it cannot produce the old quality network
good).
As in Ellison and Fudenberg (2000), we assume that the network goods are back-
ward compatible. That is, consumers of the new good enjoy network benefits from all
users (i.e. users of new and old goods), while consumers of the old good only enjoy
network benefits from consumers of the same good (e.g. Word97 vs. Word95).13
It is further assumed that the firms cannot change the quality of the goods once
they are already produced. Marginal costs of production are independent of quality
and set equal to zero. For simplicity the discount factor is equal among firms and
normalized to 1.
2.2.2 Demand Side and Expectation Formation Process
The demand side represents the core of the model. In each period there is a group of
Nt homogeneous consumers arriving in the market and, for convenience, we normalize
N1 + N2 = 1. Consumers exhibit a per-period unitary demand for a network good and
buy as soon as they reach the market. This implies that the N1 consumers make a
purchase decisions in period 1 and in period 2. Given durability, this is not a trivial
implication.
13Note that the assumption of backward compatibility implies that, conditional on successful inno-
vation, the surplus offered by the new good is independent of the identity of the firm that produces
it.
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To see this, note that the price charged to the N1 consumers in period 1 tries to
extract period 1 and 2 surpluses (i.e. the good is durable). However, period 2 surplus
is affected by the outcome of the R&D processes, the prices of the two firms in period
2 and the N1 and N2 consumers’ choices. Therefore, the willingness to pay of the N1
consumers in period 1 depends on their beliefs on how the firms are going to behave
in period 2. This gives rise to the commitment problem discussed in the introduction.
Consider first period 1. The first group of consumers, with size N1, arrives at
the beginning of period 1, finds only the incumbent’s good and observes its price (to
be derived below). We model utility by assuming that each consumer in N1 derives
a first-period benefit (gross of price) from buying from the incumbent firm given by
q1 + αx − c. In this expression, q1 is the quality of the good, α is a parameter that
measures the extent of the network benefits, x is the number of users of compatible
goods14 and c is a cost of learning to use the network good. We introduce the following
assumptions.
Assumption 3 2q1 > 0. N1 always consume the old good in period 1.
By introducing assumption 3, the model implies that even in the case where network
benefits are equal to zero, first period consumers always consume. This assumption will
allow us to analyze the model with very small (or non-existent) network benefits and
compare the results with the case where network externalities are important without
introducing discontinuities in the consumers’ behavior.
Assumption 4 q1 + αN1 − cu > 0. It is optimal for N1 to consume in both periods.
The previous assumption 4 is introduced to avoid the possibility of N1 consumers
waiting to period 2 to consume.15 This assumption reduces the number of cases to be
analyzed, and allows us to focus on the results we are interested in.16
14Note that given the homogeneity of the consumers x = N1 in period 1.
15In order to maintain the order of the exposition, the parameter cu (i.e. the cost of upgrading) is
introduced below.
16See, for example, Choi and Thum (1998) for the analysis when consumers can wait to adopt a
network good.
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Of course, the overall benefit enjoyed by consumers in N1 also depends on period 2
choices to be explained below. Note that at the beginning of period 2, the outcome of
the innovation process is realized depending on the investment decisions. Hence, there
are four possible cases in period 2; no firm innovates; only the incumbent or only the
entrant innovates; and both firms achieve the innovation.
Now consider period 2. When the N1 consumers reach the beginning of period 2,
they observe the outcome of the innovation process. If the innovation is achieved, the
N1 consumers evaluate the incremental utility from purchasing (i.e. upgrading to) the
new generation of the good and decide accordingly.17 Therefore, they compare the
benefit (gross of price) from the new good q2 + α(N2 + x)− cu with the second-period
benefit of staying with the old good q1 + αx. cu is the cost of learning to use the new
generation (i.e. cost of upgrading). It is assumed that cu < c. As common in models
with network externalities, the equilibrium value of x depends on the way consumers
form expectations about other consumers behavior.
We assume that consumers are able to coordinate on the outcome that maximize
their surplus (i.e. Pareto-Optimal coordination equilibrium).18 In other words, con-
sumers are able to coordinate on the choice that maximize joint surplus. Thus, they
compare q2 + α − cu with q1 + αN1 and, in consequence, the incremental utility from
upgrading is given by q∆ + αN2 − cu. Hence, whenever q∆ + αN2 − cu > 0 upgrade by
the N1 consumers takes place, otherwise the N1 consumers do not buy the new good
and stay with the old one. We denote this (candidate) price of upgrading as pu.
In period 2, a second group of consumers with size N2 arrives in the market. This
group of consumers observes the outcome of the innovation process, observes prices
(to be derived below) and makes purchase decisions. In particular, it is assumed that
whenever the innovation is successful (either by the incumbent, the entrant or both)
the N2 consumers do not exhibit any preference for the old good produced by the
incumbent. That is, the willingness to pay of N2 consumers for the new generation of
17Recall that for the N1 consumers the identity of the firms that produces the new good in period
2 is irrelevant (footnote 14).
18See Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Farrell and Katz (2005).
Chapter 2 Durable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalities 34
the good is equal to q2 + α − c.19 We denote this (candidate) price as pn. Note that
given the assumption of backward compatibility, consumers of the new good enjoy the
full network benefits (i.e αx with x = 1).
In the case that the innovation does not take place (i.e. no firm innovates), the
N2 consumers decides for the old good with a willingness to pay equal to q1 + α − c.
We denote this (candidate) price as po. Therefore, analogous to Ellison and Fudenberg
(2000), it is the choice of the N1 consumers in period 2 that represents the most
important part of the analysis.
In the next section we present the main results of the market outcome.
2.3 Market Outcome
In this section we consider the optimal pricing decision and the private incentives to
innovate of the two firms. As a benchmark, we consider first the monopoly case. This
analysis will allow us to compare the present chapter with the current literature, to
analyze the impact of network externalities and highlight the main results we obtain in
comparison with Ellison and Fudenberg (2000). Once the monopoly case is considered,
we analyze the model where the incumbent monopolist faces the threat of entry. In
both cases, we consider the commitment as well as the no commitment case given its
role in the durability literature discussed in the introduction.
As has been widely highlighted in the literature, the no commitment case is equiva-
lent to focus on the Subgame-Perfect Nash-Equilibrium (SPNE), and the commitment
case corresponds to the Nash-Equilibrium (NE) of the global multi-stage game.
2.3.1 A Monopoly Model
In order to solve the monopoly model, we first solve for the period 2 demands, profits
and price equilibria. Then, we turn to the investment decision at the end of period 1
and derive the commitment and the no commitment case.
19This assumption allows the incumbent monopolist to extract the full consumers surplus in the
case without entry. Therefore, it permits us to conclude that any reduction in the monopolist’s profit
implies a reduction in social welfare.
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Second Period - Pricing Decision
Before deriving the equilibrium prices conditional on the outcome of the R&D process,
it is important to note that the value of pu is critical to the analysis because it describes
the situation where upgrade takes place.
Assumption 5 pu > 0. Whenever the new good is produced, it is optimal for N1 to
upgrade.
We focus on the analysis, unless otherwise noticed, for cases when assumption 5
holds. (i.e. upgrade is possible and optimal) and later on we present a brief discussion
considering the case when assumption 5 does not hold.
Note that price competition depends on the outcome of the innovation process,
therefore, there are two cases to consider according to the success or failure of the
monopolist’s innovation process.
Monopolist does not innovate. In this case, the monopolist still produces the
old good with quality q1 in period 2. As explained before, the N1 consumers do not
make any purchase decision (they already have the only existing good) and the N2
consumers buy the old good if the price is less or equal to the maximum surplus
offered by the good (i.e. p ≤ po). Therefore, given the homogeneity of consumers, the
incumbent charges po to the N2 consumers that are his only revenue source and extract
their full surplus.
Monopolist does innovate. In this case, the new generation of the good with
quality q2 is produced by the monopolist. Under assumption 5 and the coordination
assumption, it is optimal for the N1 consumers to upgrade if the price charged is less
or equal to the incremental surplus offered by the new good (i.e. p ≤ pu). Again, given
consumer homogeneity, the monopolist charges pu to the N1 consumers. Using similar
arguments, it can be shown that the monopolists charges pn to the N2 consumers. Note
that innovation increase the source of revenues for the incumbent.
Table (2.1) summarizes the pricing decision by the monopolist in period 2 condi-
tional on the outcome of the R&D process. Each cell in the table shows the price
charged to the N1 and the N2 consumers, respectively.
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Monopoly Monopoly
does not innovate does innovate
Monopolist’s 0 q∆ + αN2 − cu
Prices q1 + α− c q2 + α− c
Table 2.1: Period 2 - Pricing Decision - Monopoly case
First Period - Investment Decision
Suppose that to obtain the improved quality in period 2, the monopoly has to invest
and succeed according to the R&D process described above. That is, the monopolist
must decide the probability s that in period 2 the innovation is achieved and the
new generation of the good with quality q2 is produced.
20 The cost of choosing the
probability s is given by C(s) = as
2
2
, where a represents a cost parameter. Assume
that consumers coordinate on the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Then, if the innovation
is successful, for q∆ + αN2 − cu > 0 (i.e. assumption 5 holds) in period 2 the N1
consumers upgrade and pays a price pu and the N2 consumers adopt the new good.
If q∆ + αN2 − cu < 0 (i.e. given that the innovation is achieved and assumption 5
does not hold) the N1 consumers do not upgrade and the N2 consumers adopt the
new technology. If the innovation is not achieved, the N1 consumers do not make any
decision and the N2 consumers adopt the old good. Consider the case where assumption
5 holds, then, the investment problem of the monopolist and the end of period 1 is
given by,
max
s
ΠM = N1p1 + s(N1pu + N2pn) + (1− s)(N2po)−
s2
2
(2.1)
with,
p1 = q1 + αN1 − c + s(sn − pu) + (1− s)(so)
In this expressions, we have simplified considering a = 1 pu = q2 − q1 + αN2 − cu,
pn = q2 + α− c, po = q1 + α− c, sn = q2 + α− cu and so = q1 + α.
In this expression, N1p1 corresponds to the period 1 revenues, s(N1pu + N2pn) +
20Note that if the innovation can be achieved with certainty and at no cost, the analysis is the one
presented in Ellison and Fudenberg (2000)
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(1 − s)(N2po) are the period 2 revenues and s
2
2
is the cost attached to the innovation
process.
Consider the revenues obtained in period 1. As can be seen, p1 extracts the full
surplus enjoyed by the N1. In particular, q1 + αN1 − c represents the period 1 surplus
and s(sn − pu) + (1− s)(so) is the expected period 2 surplus that is conditional on the
outcome of the innovation. That is, with probability s the innovation is achieved and,
given assumption 5 holds, it is optimal for the N1 consumers to upgrade in period 2
with a net surplus of sn − pu. On the other hand, if the innovation is not achieved, the
period 2 net surplus of the N1 consumers is equal to so.
Importantly, note that the price charged in period 1, p1, depends on the level of
investment because the surplus that the N1 consumers enjoy in period 2 is uncertain at
the beginning of period 1. Moreover, observe that ∂p1
∂s
= −αN2 < 0. This observation
implies that through investment, the monopolist reduces the future value of its good
sold in period 1. Therefore, a higher R&D investment reduces the willingness to pay
from the N1 consumers in period 1 as the durability literature suggests. At the same
time, a higher investment level increases the probability of introducing a new generation
of the network good in period 2, and in consequence, expected period 2 revenues are
increased. As we will see, it is the interaction (i.e. trade-off) between these two effects
that represents the main impact of durability in the R&D incentives by the monopolist
and highlights the role of commitment.
The revenues obtained in period 2 presented by the second and third term of equa-
tion (2.1) have an straightforward interpretation. In the following, we solve for the op-
timal investment decision given the problem stated in equation (2.1). We first present
the no commitment case and then the commitment case.
No Commitment Case
Under no commitment the analysis of the SPNE rule out any non-credible threats
by the monopolist. Therefore, consumers in period 1 determine their willingness to
pay considering the case of what would the monopolist do after the N1 consumers
have made their period 1 purchasing decision. In other words, solving backwards and
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considering the R&D level that maximizes second period profits for the monopolist, we
obtain the following first-order condition,
0 = N1pu + N2pn −N2po − snc
It can be seen that the second-order condition for an interior solution also holds.
Thus, the corresponding optimal level of investment in the absence of commitment by
the monopolist is given by,
snc = q∆ −N1cu + αN1N2 (2.2)
Before analyzing this result, we solve first for the commitment case.
Commitment Case
In this case, the monopolist is able to internalize the negative impact that his in-
vestment decision has on the first period prices (i.e. recall ∂p1
∂s
< 0). Therefore, by
considering the NE of the global multi-stage game, we obtain the following first order
condition,
0 = −N1N2α + N1pu + N2pn −N2po − sc
Analogously, the second-order condition for an interior solution holds and the op-
timal level of investment provided that the incumbent is able to commit is given by,
sc = q∆ −N1cu (2.3)
As can be readily seen from the preceding analysis, snc > sc holds for any para-
meter configurations. This results is not surprising and is in line with the traditional
literature. It says that without commitment, the monopolist has the incentive to invest
more than in the presence of commitment because it does not internalize the negative
impact of its investment level on the price charged in period 1. Moreover, it is evident
that the difference between the two investment levels is equal to αN1N2 which van-
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ishes when the network externalities are not present (i.e. α = 0). This implies that
the effect of commitment is completely isolated and will allow us to conclude that any
inefficiency, if present, will be solely due to the presence of network externalities.21
This result is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Without the threat of entry, the monopolist invests more in the absence
of commitment than it would be the case if commitment is possible. This difference is
only due to the presence of network externalities.
In addition, comparing the two profit levels (solving for the corresponding optimal
investment levels in equation (2.1)) it can be shown that ΠcM −ΠncM =
(N1)2(N2)2α2
2
which
is unambiguously positive. Again, this result highlights the main commitment problem
on the R&D incentives of a monopolist that arises in the presence of durable goods
(see Waldman (1996)). That is, once a monopolist does not have the possibility to
commit to future R&D investments, its optimal decision affects negatively its overall
profitability. Importantly, note that the previous result vanishes if α = 0.
In addition, given that consumers are homogeneous, the monopolist is able to ex-
tract all the surplus from the consumers and, therefore, the absence of commitment
reduces social surplus.
Proposition 8 For the monopoly case, the absence of commitment in the R&D invest-
ment implies a lower social surplus compared to the case when commitment is possible.
This result is only due to the presence of network externalities
The analysis of the monopoly model presented two main results. First, the presence
of network externalities implies a commitment problem in the investment decision by
the monopolists. This commitment problem is represented by an over-investment in
comparison with the case where commitment is possible. And second, due to the
presence of network externalities, the commitment problem implies a lower overall
profit and an associated lower social welfare. These results are in line with the current
literature and represent the benchmark for comparison for our analysis of entry.
21This result also holds in the Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) paper.
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2.3.2 A Model with Entry
In this subsection we extend the monopoly analysis presented above and consider the
case of a potential entrant. Keeping the same framework, we model the case of an
incumbent monopolist that serves the entire market in period 1 and must compete
with a potential entrant in period 2. As explained before, entry is conditional on
innovation and, therefore, both firms invest in developing a new technology at the end
of period 1. At the beginning of period 2 the outcome of the innovation process is
realized and price competition takes place.
As in the analysis of the monopoly case, the investment decision depends on the
equilibrium concept adopted, namely, SPNE or NE, which characterizes the no com-
mitment and commitment case, respectively. In order to proceed, we first solve for the
period 2 demands, profits and price equilibria that follow from Bertrand competition.
Then, we turn to the strategic investment decision at the end of period 1 and derive
the commitment and the no commitment case.
Second Period - Price Competition
As in the monopoly analysis and in order to simplify exposition, we assume in what
follows that assumption 5 holds. Note that price competition depends on the outcome
of the innovation process, therefore, there are four cases to consider according to the
success or failure of a given firm’s innovation process, and the identity of that firm.
No firm innovates. In this case, no firm achieves the innovation. In consequence,
the incumbent firm still produces the old good with quality q1 in period 2 and the
entrant firm has no production. As explained before, the N1 consumers do not make
any purchase decision (they already have the only existing good) and the N2 consumers
buy the old good if the price is less or equal to the total surplus they get from it.
Therefore, the incumbent is able to charge po to the N2 consumers that are his only
revenue source in period 2. Note that this case, ex-post, is identical to the monopoly
case without innovation.
Only Incumbent innovates. In this case, the new generation of the good is
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Firm Both Firms Incumbent Entrant No Firm
Innovate Innovates Innovates Innovates
Incumbent’s 0 q∆ + αN2 − cu 0 0
Prices 0 q2 + α− c 0 q1 + α− c
Entrants’s 0 0 q∆ + αN2 − cu 0
Prices 0 0 q2 + α− c 0
Table 2.2: Period 2 - Price Competition - Entry case
produced by the incumbent and the entrant does not enter the market. Therefore,
given the assumption that the consumers are able to coordinate on the Pareto-Optimal
equilibrium, the incumbent charges pu to the N1 consumers and pn to the N2 consumers.
Note that innovation increase the source of revenues for the incumbent. Given that
entry does not take place, this case is, ex-post, identical to the monopoly case with
successful innovation.
Only entrant innovates. In this case, the entrant innovates and is able to produce
the new generation of the good in period 2. Therefore, the entrant firm is able to
capture the N2 consumers and charges pn to them. In addition, and assuming that he
can identify the N1 consumers (i.e. the entrant can offer a cross-subsidy), the price
charged to them is pu subject to the coordination assumption discussed above.
22
Both firms innovate. In this case, both firms achieve the innovation and compete
with homogeneous products in a homogeneous market. Thus, Bertrand competition
drives prices and period 2 profits to zero.
Table (2.2) summarizes the pricing decision in period 2 conditional on the outcome
of the R&D process. Each cell in the table shows the price charged to the N1 and the
N2 consumers, respectively.
First Period - Investment Decisions
After deriving the equilibrium prices from the competition in period 2 between the
incumbent and the potential entrant, we are able to analyze the optimal investment
decisions by the two firms. Note that in the case of the threat of entry, the investment
22Note that if the entrant cannot offer a cross-subsidy, the price charged to the N1 is in any case
equal to the incremental benefit that those consumer enjoy by purchasing the new good from the
entrant firm.
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decisions are derived strategically.
As explained before, the investment decisions correspond for the firms to choose the
probability, sk for k ∈ I, E, that the innovation is achieved in period 2. In addition,
there is a cost C(sk) =
as2k
2
associated with a given probability s, where a correspond
to a cost parameter.
The overall problem of the incumbent firm is given by,
max
sI
ΠI = N1p1 + sI(1− sE)(N1pu + N2pn) + (1− sI)(1− sE)(N2po)−
s2I
2
(2.4)
with,
p1 = q1 + αN1 − c + sI(1− sE)(sn − pu) + (1− sI)(1− sE)(so)
In this expressions, we have simplified considering a = 1 pu = q2 − q1 + αN2 − cu,
pn = q2 + α− c, po = q1 + α− c, sn = q2 + α− cu and so = q1 + α.
In this expression, N1p1 corresponds to the period 1 revenues, sI(1 − sE)(N1pu +
N2pn) are the period 2 revenues that can be obtained if the incumbent firm is the only
innovator, (1− sI)(1− sE)(N2po) are the period 2 revenues for the case where no firm
innovates, and
s2I
2
is the cost attached to the innovation process. Recall that if the two
firms innovate, profits are dissipated due to the price competition and that there is no
revenues for the incumbent if the potential entrant is the unique innovator.
Consider the revenues obtained in period 1. As can be seen, p1 extracts the full
surplus enjoyed by the N1 by charging the total surplus enjoyed in period 1 (i.e. q1 +
αN1 − c) and the expected surplus enjoyed in period 2 (i.e. sI(1− sE)(sn − pu) + (1−
sI)(1 − sE)(so)). Moreover, as in the monopoly case, the period 1 price charged by
the incumbent decreases with its own investment level. In particular, ∂p1
∂sI
= −αN2(1−
sE) < 0. This observation implies that through a higher level of investment, the
incumbent firm reduces the willingness to pay of the N1 consumers in period 1. At
the same time, and similar to the monopoly case, higher investments boost period
2 revenues. However, investments in the context analyzed in this subsection play an
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additional role: deter entry. Therefore, we analyze not only the trade-off between more
revenues in period 1 or 2, but also consider the preemptive role of investments.
Analogously, the problem of the entrant firm is given by,
max
sE
ΠE = sE(1− sI)(N1pu + N2pn)−
s2E
2
(2.5)
Again, we have simplified using a = 1 pu = q2 − q1 + αN2 − cu, pn = q2 + α − c,
po = q1 + α − c, sn = q2 + α − cu and so = q1 + α. Note that the entrant can only
have positive revenues if it is the unique innovator. In addition, it is important to
highlight that the fact that the potential entrant has no period 1 revenues, it will not
face any commitment problem. However, given that the investment levels are obtained
strategically, the behavior of the incumbent has an important impact on the behavior
of the potential entrant.
No Commitment Case
As in the monopolist problem, this case is obtained by focusing on the SPNE. Accord-
ingly, the first-order condition for the incumbent firm taking into account only second
period profits is given by,
0 = (1− sE)(N1pu + N2pn)− (1− sE)(N2po)− sncI (2.6)
Considering equation (2.5), the SPNE concept provides the first-order condition for
the entrant firm given by,
0 = (1− sI)(N1pu + N2pn)− sncE (2.7)
It can be seen that the second-order conditions for an interior solution are satisfied.
Thus, solving equations (2.6) and (2.7) provides the equilibrium R&D levels for the
incumbent and the entrant firm in the absence of commitment by the incumbent firm.
Again, note that given that the entrant firm only competes in period 2, it has no
choice concerning a committed action. Before analyzing the results, we calculate first
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the commitment case.
Commitment Case
As should be clear by now, the NE of the global game represents the commitment
solution and provides the following first-order condition for the investment level by the
incumbent. That is,
0 = N1((1− sE)(sn − pu)− (1− sE)(so))
+ (1− sE)(N1pu + N2pn)− (1− sE)(N2po)− scI
(2.8)
Analogously, the first-order condition for the entrant firm is,
0 = (1− sI)(N1pu + N2pn)− scE (2.9)
As in the case of no commitment, solving equations (2.8) and (2.9) provides the
equilibrium investment levels for both firm in the presence of commitment of the incum-
bent firm. In order to simplify the analysis (given the large number of parameters),
we consider the behavior of the best response functions described by the first order
conditions. Given the specifications on the R&D processes, from observations of equa-
tions (2.6) and (2.7) for the no commitment case, and equations (2.8) and (2.9) for
the commitment case, the best response functions are linear and therefore provide a
unique equilibrium. Moreover, they are downward sloping implying strategic substi-
tutability in the investment levels. We require and additional assumption to guarantee
the existence of an economically plausible equilibrium.
Assumption 6 q2 < 1+cu−α. The best response functions that describe the incentives
to innovate are stable.
As can be seen, assumption 6 restricts the size of the innovation. This assumption
guarantees, in addition to provide stability to the best response functions, that for any
parameter configurations, the probabilities of success lie on the interval (0, 1). Figure
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2.1 shows the behavior of the best response functions and suffices to provide the main
results.
As can be seen from the figure, RE(sI) represents the best respond function for the
entrant as a function of the investment level of the incumbent firm. This function is
obtained from solving equation (2.7) for sncE .
23 Equivalently, the best respond functions
for the incumbent firm, RInc(sE) and RIc(sE), are obtained from solving equations (2.6)
and (2.8) for sncI and s
c
I , respectively. It can be shown that under assumption 6 the
best response functions lie always on the positive quadrant and below 1.
In particular, the analysis of the market outcome is summarized in Figure 2.1.
Figure 1a shows the case where network externalities are important and Figure 1b
shows the case without network externalities. Figure 1a shows two main results. First,
independent of the presence of commitment, the potential entrant always invest more
that the incumbent firm. That is, in any case the equilibrium lies below the 45 degree
line. And Second, as explained above, in the absence of commitment, the incumbent
firm does not internalize the negative effect that its own investment has on his first
period price and, therefore, invest more than it would be the case if commitment is
possible. As a consequence, once commitment is considered the incumbent corrects
its R&D expenditures negatively. This correction implies a stronger incentive for the
entrant to innovate and, hence, increases the entrant’s level of investment. In Figure
2.1 this is represented through the fact that the commitment equilibrium lies below and
to the right of the no commitment equilibrium. This result holds for any parameter
configuration satisfying the assumptions of the model.
Proposition 9 Independent of the possibility of commitment by the incumbent, the
potential entrant always invests in R&D more than the incumbent firm. Moreover, this
difference is increased if commitment is possible.
In addition, from equations (2.6) and (2.8) it can be shown that the difference
between the commitment and no commitment case is only due to the presence of
23Note that the form of RE(sI) does not depend on the presence of commitment because the entrant
only competes in period 2. Therefore, RE(sI) can also be obtained from solving equation (2.9) for
scE .
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network externalities. This is represented in Figure 2.1 by the fact that the difference
between the best response function of the incumbent without commitment lies above
the best response function in the presence of commitment. In particular, the difference
between the points at which both lines intersect the vertical axis is always positive
and equal to αN1N2. Therefore, the strategic impact of entry is completely isolated.
Figure (1b) shows a particular case with α = 0.
Proposition 10 The difference in the optimal investment levels with or without com-
mitment is only due to the presence of network externalities.
Importantly, several numerical analyses suggest that, for some parameter config-
urations, the profit of the incumbent is higher in the absence of commitment than
it would be the case if commitment is possible. That is, the threat of entry implies
that in some special cases it is strategically optimal for the incumbent to increase its
R&D investment as a mechanism to response to the potential entrant. This result is
in clear contrast with the monopoly analysis presented before and, therefore, extends
the analysis of Ellison and Fudenberg (2000).
The result that the threat of entry may eliminate the commitment problem of a
monopolist in durable goods market has been analyzed by Bucovetsky and Chilton
(1986), Ausubel and Deckenere (1986) and Vettas (2001). However, to the best of
our knowledge, there is no analysis that considers the role of R&D incentives in this
situation and, therefore, our result differs from the current literature.
Proposition 11 With the threat of entry, the incumbent firm may achieve a higher
profit by strategically not committing its investment level. This is in contrast to the
case without the threat of entry.
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to analyze the social efficiency of the
incentives to innovate in the presence of network externalities and durable goods. This
is the purpose of the next section.
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Figure 2.1: Best Response Functions - Market Outcome
2.4 Social Optimum
In the previous section we obtained the incentives to innovate in an industry that
exhibits network externalities and durable goods. In particular, we considered the
monopoly case and concluded that, in line with the current literature, in the absence
of commitment the monopolist has incentive to invest in R&D in excess of what it
would maximize its overall profits. Moreover, we showed that the negative impact of
this over-investment was reflected in lower social welfare and it was a consequence of
the presence of network externalities.
Subsequently, we analyzed the case where the monopolist is faced by a potential
entrant. Interestingly, we were able to conclude that due to the threat of entry, the
commitment problem exhibited in the monopoly case by the incumbent firm was not
present anymore. Even thought the absence of commitment was reflected in higher
investments because the incumbent is not able to internalize the negative impact on
his period 1 pricing, the threat of entry, and the induced higher level of investment,
more than compensated the lower period 1 revenues by increasing the expected period
2 profits.
However, it is important to analyze the social efficiency of the results obtained in
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the previous section. Therefore, and as a major objective of this chapter, the present
section consider the problem faced by a social planner that maximizes social surplus. In
particular, we obtain the socially optimal R&D incentives and compare our results with
the ones obtained before for the case of the market outcome. Moreover, we investigate
the role of network externalities in the potential social inefficiencies that may arise.
Assuming that the social planner is able to produce the two goods, set prices equal
to zero, induce adoption and invest in R&D, its problem can be written as,
max
sI ,sE
W = N1p
s
1 + sIsE(N1sn + N2pn)sI(1− sE)(N1sn + N2pn)
+ sI(1− sE)(N1sn + N2pn) + (1− sI)(1− sE)(N1so + N2po)
− s
2
I
2
− s
2
E
2
(2.10)
with,
ps1 = q1 + αN1 − c
As before, we have simplified taking into account a = 1 pu = q2 − q1 + αN2 − cu,
pn = q2 + α− c, po = q1 + α− c, sn = q2 + α− cu and so = q1 + α.
Equation (2.10) is obtained by calculating, for each period, the maximum social
surplus that can be enjoyed by the entire population given that the social planner
can induce adoption. In addition, the assumption that the social planner invests in
the two technologies simply reflects a risk diversification strategy. That is, ex-ante,
it is impossible for the social planner to realize which technology will be successful in
period 2. Also, note that investing in both technologies is an efficient strategy given
the quadratic form of the costs associated with the innovation process.
Note that for the social planner problem the SPNE and the NE coincide. Therefore,
we can calculate the first-order condition that provide the socially optimal investment
level. This expressions are,
0 = (1− sE)(N1sn + N2pn)− (1− sE)(N1so + N2po)− swI (2.11)
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0 = (1− sI)(N1sn + N2pn)− (1− sI)(N1so + N2po)− swE (2.12)
As can be seen from equations (2.11) and (2.12), the social planner invests equally
in both technologies. This is due to the fact that the social planner internalizes the
costs of the projects. Moreover, straightforward manipulations of equations (2.11) and
(2.8) show that the best response function of the social planner is identical to the
one exhibit by the incumbent firm in the presence of commitment. This implies that
in order to compare the social optimum with the results from the market outcome
we should consider the results presented in Figure 2.1 with the level of investment
produced by the incumbent’s best response function in the presence of commitment.
Given that the social planner invest equally in both technology, the social optimal level
of investments is reached in the intersection of the incumbent’s best response function
with commitment and the 45 degree line. This is presented in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 provides two interesting results. First, it shows that the entrant firm,
unambiguously, always over-invests in R&D in relation to the socially optimal amount.
That is, independent of the presence of commitment by the incumbent, the market
equilibrium always lie to the right of the social optimum. This result is due to the fact
that a successful innovation represents the only possibility for the potential entrant to
make positive profits.
Proposition 12 The potential entrant unambiguously exhibit an over-investment in
comparison with the social optimum. This result is independent of the possibility of
commitment by the incumbent firm.
In addition, it can be observed in Figure 2.2 that in the absence of network exter-
nalities or for sufficiently low values of α the incumbent firm always under-invests in
R&D. However, depending on the extent of the network externalities (i.e the value of
α) the incumbent firm may exhibit a lower (Figure 2a), equal (Figure 2b) or higher
(Figure 2c) level of investment compared with the social optimum. This result follows
from numerical simulations.
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Proposition 13 Depending on the extent of the network externalities, the incumbent
firm may exhibit a lower, equal or higher investment level in comparison with the social
optimum.
This result sheds some light on the controversy around the efficiency of the ob-
served market structure in network industries. As has been pointed in the literature
(and observed in reality), network industries are characterized by the presence of few
successful incumbents. This observed structure has led regulation authorities to con-
sider whether the high level of concentration is detrimental for the socially optimal
level of innovation undertaken in these industries. Our analysis shows that there is
no clear answer to that questions and that the measurement of the extent of network
externalities may be crucial for policy purposes. Hence, any conclusion must be based
on a formal analysis and this chapter is a small step in that direction.
2.5 Conclusions
We presented a model of R&D competition between an incumbent and a potential
entrant in market with durable goods and network externalities. In particular, we
analyzed the market outcome and the social efficiency of the incentive to innovate in
the presence of uncertain innovation processes. The robustness of the presented results
with respect to the assumed functional forms is the objective of current work.
We found three main results. First, the threat of entry reverses the commitment
problem that a monopolist (without such threat) may face in its R&D decision given
the durability of the network goods. This result is not present in the current literature
on R&D and follows from the role that R&D incentives play in deterring entry. In our
case, the monopolist’s commitment problem arises only due to the presence of network
externalities.
Second, the levels of R&D determined by market outcome might differ from the
socially optimal levels. In particular, a potential entrant always over-invests (as an
entry strategy) and an established incumbent might exhibit higher, lower or equal R&D
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Figure 2.2: Best Response Fncs. - Social Optimum
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levels in comparison with the social optimum. This result suggests that successful entry
takes place too often in comparison with the social optimum.
And third, the extent of network externalities is the crucial parameter in the effi-
ciency of the incumbent R&D level. In fact, it is only the presence of network exter-
nalities that permits, potentially, to the established incumbent to provide an efficient
level of innovation. Without network externalities (or very low network effects), it
is shown that the incumbent firm always under-invests in R&D efforts. This result
sheds some light on the debate whether a dominant incumbent in a network industry
provides sufficient innovation to the society.
We recognize several areas of further research in the area of R&D incentives in
the presence of network externalities and durable goods. To reduce the dependence on
initial conditions and parameter assumptions, a fully dynamic model may shed light on
some more realistic characteristics of industry evolution inside the framework analyzed
in current chapter. In addition, the analysis of compatibility decisions must also be
considered given its obvious relevance in these industries but for the time being beyond
the scope of the present chapter. Finally, a more detailed (or alternative) description
of the consumers’ coordination assumptions may enrich the results.
Chapter 2 Durable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalities 53
References
Ausubel, and Deckenere, (1987), ”One is Almost Enough for Competition”, RAND
Journal of Economics, 18, 255-274.
Bagnoli, M., S. Salant, and J., Swierzbinski (1989), ”Durable-goods Monopoly with
Discrete Demand”, Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1459-1478.
Bensaid, B., and Lesne, J.P., (1996), ”Dynamic Monopoly Pricing with Network
Externalities”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 14, 837-855.
Besen, S. and J. Farrell, (1994), ”Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics
in Standardization”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, pp. 117-131.
De Bijil, P.W.J. and S. Goyal, (1995), ”Technological Change in Markets with Network
Externalities”, International of Industrial Organization, 13, 307-325.
Bucovetsky, S. and J. Chilton, (1986), ”Concurring Renting and Selling in a Durable
Goods Monopoly under Threat of Entry”, RAND Journal of Economics, 17,
261-275.
Bulow, J., (1982), ”Durable Goods Monopolists”, Journal of Political Economy, 15,
314-332.
Bulow, J., (1986), ”An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolescence”, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 101, 729-749.
Cabral, L.M.B., D. Salant, and G. Woroch, (1999), ”Monopoly Pricing with Network
Externalities”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17, 199-214.
Coase, R., (1972), ”Durability and Monopoly”, Journal of Law and Economics, 15,
143-143.
Choi, J.P., (1994), ”Network Externalities, Compatibility Choice, and Planned Ob-
solescence”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 42, 167-182.
Chapter 2 Durable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalities 54
Ellison, G., and D. Fudenberg, (2000), ”The Neo-Luddite’s Lament: Excessive Up-
grades in the Software Industry”, RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 253-272.
Farrell, J. and M. Katz, (2005), ”Competition or Predation? Consumer Coordination,
Strategic Pricing and Price Floors in Network Markets”, Journal of Industrial
Economics, LIII, 203-231.
Farrell, J. and G. Saloner, (1985), ”Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation”,
Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 16, 70-83.
Farrell, J. and G. Saloner, (1986), ”Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncement, and Predation”, American Economic Review, 76,
940-955.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, (1998), ”Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks”, RAND
Journal of Economics, 29, 235-258.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole, (2000), ”Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry”,
Journal of Industrial Economics, XLVIII, 373-390.
Grout, P.A., and I. Park, (2005), ”Competitive Planned Obsolescence”, RAND Jour-
nal of Economics, 36, 696-612.
Gul, F., H. Sonnenschein, and R. Wilson, (1986), ”Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly
and the Coase Conjecture”, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 155-190.
Hendel, I., and A. Lizzeri, (1999), ”Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets”,
American Economic Review, 89, 1097-1115.
Kahn, C. M., (1986), ”The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increas-
ing Costs”, Econometrica, 54, 275-294.
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, (1985), ”Network Externalities, Competition and Compat-
ibility”, American Economic Review, vol. 75, 424-440.
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, (1986), ”Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network
Externalities”, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 822-84.
Chapter 2 Durable Goods, Innovation and Network Externalities 55
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, (1992), ”Product Introduction with Network Externalities”,
Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, 55-84.
Katz, M. and C. Shapiro, (1994), ”Systems Competition and Network Effects”, Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, pp. 93-115.
Kristiansen, E.G., (1996), ”R&D in Markets with Network Externalities, International
Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 14, pp. 769-784.
Mason, R., (2000), ”Network Externalities and the Coase Conjecture”, European Eco-
nomic Review, 44, 1981-1992.
Reinganum, J., (1989), ”The Timing of Innovation: Research, development and dif-
fusion”. In R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, (eds.) (1989). Handbook of Industrial
Organization, North-Holland. 849-908.
Shapiro, C. and H. Varian, (1999). Information Rules: A strategic guide to the
network economy. Harvard Business School Press.
Stokey, N., (1981), ”Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing”, Bell Journal
of Economics, 12, 112-128.
Waldman, M., (1993), ”A New Perspective on Planned Obsolescence”, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 108, 273-283.
Waldman, M., (1996), ”Planned Obsolescence and the R&D Decision”, RAND Jour-
nal of Economics, 27, 583-595.
Waldman, M., (1997), ”Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alterna-
tive Explanation for Leasing”, Journal of Law and Economics, 40, 61-92.
Waldman, M., (2003), ”Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 17, 131-154.
Chapter 3
Dynamic R&D Incentives with
Network Externalities1
3.1 Introduction
An industry exhibits network externalities when the benefit that consumers enjoy from
purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers
that use the same and/or compatible products. For the firms in those sectors (e.g.
telecommunications, consumer electronics, operating systems, etc.), the presence of
network externalities implies that the attractiveness of their products is a function
of their quality-adjusted prices and the potential benefit attached to their expected
network sizes (i.e. installed bases).2
As a consequence, consumers must form expectations about the future evolution
of such installed bases before acquiring a network good. Anticipating the best future
network is a key consideration because the costs associated with switching from one
network to another could be prohibitively high. Thus, the role of installed bases and
expectations are crucial for consumer choice and, even decisive, in the future of a
network industry: A network technology may dominate a market only because it is
1This chapter extends previous joint work with Toker Doganoglu, University of Munich.
2See Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrel and Saloner (1985, 1986) for seminal treatments,
and Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Economides (1996) for surveys on network markets.
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expected to do so.3 For this reason, it is not surprising that industries with network
externalities are characterized by a small number of successful firms or, in some cases,
only one dominant incumbent serving the entire market.
Several studies have shown how pricing considerations, as well as compatibility,
entry and investment decisions are affected by the presence of network externalities.4
Moreover, due to the presence of these externalities, firms in network industries might
even follow very different rules from those observed in traditional industries.5
This chapter develops a fully dynamic duopoly model of quality competition and
analyzes how the presence of network externalities influences industry Research and
Development (R&D) incentives. In doing so, we study the consequences for industry
evolution, the efficiency of the market outcome and the role of consumer expectations.6
Rapid technological progress derived from R&D competition is a common obser-
vation in many industries with network externalities. Technological innovations allow
rivalling firms to introduce new products like interactive TV, Digital Versatile Disk
(DVD), and digital imaging. In nascent industries, extensive investments in R&D are
usually required to introduce new standards or dominant designs.
However, the literature on investment processes, R&D efforts and innovation ini-
tiatives in industries that exhibit network externalities is still in its early stage of
development. The existing literature, in its great majority, takes the processes of R&D
as exogenously given and analyzes the conditions under which an innovation is adopted.
Moreover, most of the work devoted to the analysis of investment decisions with net-
work externalities considers situations where the entrant arrives with a (exogenously
given) new technology, without considering a strategic response by the incumbent to
3The initial success of the MS-DOS operating system is usually attributed not to any technical
superiority, but to the fact that it was supported by IBM.
4See, for example, Gabel (1991), Besen and Farrell (1994), Katz and Shapiro (1994), Grindley
(1995) and Shapiro and Varian (1999) for general analyses of the impact of network externalities on
firms’ strategies.
5While the producer of a new product in a conventional market tends to place it on the market
early, differentiate the good as much as possible, protect it from imitation and charge high prices,
successful producers of network goods have often done the exact opposite. See Grindley (1995).
6In fact, among some authors, Besen and Farrell (1994), Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Arthur (2000)
have pointed out that it is the role of consumer expectations what determines the particular dynamics
in industries with network externalities, in comparison with other industries under increasing returns
to scale.
Chapter 3 Dynamic R&D Incentives with Network Externalities 58
the threat of entry.7
Some of the main results of this literature are: i) new technologies tend to be
adopted too early and the successful entrant remains as incumbent forever; ii) the
structure of property rights (i.e. sponsorship) over a new technology affect decisively
its potential for adoption; and iii) R&D incentives play no major role in affecting
consumer expectations, and hence, choice. Kristiansen (1996) and Choi (1994) consider
the case of endogenous investment in network industries using two-period models and
analyze the riskiness associated to the R&D projects. Their results are focused on the
divergence between private and social incentives to invest and show the role of network
externalities in this divergence.
In this chapter, our dynamic model of quality competition with network externali-
ties adapts the Markov-perfect equilibrium framework presented in Ericson and Pakes
(1995). We depart from the current literature on network industries by focusing our
analysis on three main areas. First, we consider endogenous and uncertain R&D efforts
taking into account the way consumers form expectations. This allows us to analyze
the incentives to innovate as a result of strategic interaction inside the industry and to
explore the impact of network externalities on industry evolution. Second, we embed
our analysis in a fully dynamic framework. This implies that our results are inde-
pendent of initial and/or end conditions, permitting us to determine the equilibrium
market structure endogenously. And third, we consider the long run social efficiency
of the R&D incentives that drives the evolution of the network industry.
Specifically, we consider two firms, an established firm and a challenger, that com-
pete each period with two incompatible technologies over an infinite horizon. To cap-
ture the role of the installed base, we assume overlapping generations of homogeneous
consumers that live for two periods and make purchases (inelastically) only once when
they arrive to the market. Thus, in each period the population consists of a ”young”
and an ”old” generation of consumers.
The established firm in period t is the firm that won competition in period t − 1
7See Farrell and Saloner (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1986), Katz and Shapiro (1986), Katz and
Shapiro (1992), De Bijil and Goyal (1995), Shy (1996), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), among others.
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(”young” consumers bought from it) and exhibits an installed base in period t (”old”
consumers cannot make another purchase). In addition, both firms offer a technology,
whose quality can be improved through endogenous and uncertain R&D efforts. At
each t, a firm invests in order to develop, with positive probability, an improvement of
its quality for period t + 1. For simplicity, we assume that R&D outcome is either a
success or a failure and, if it is successful, it increments the value of the quality by a
fixed amount.
Moreover, we consider the case of R&D competition outside the industry. This
situation can be interpreted as the role played by independent research facilities, uni-
versities, etc. In our framework, the role of outside competition implies that with an
exogenous probability, there is the possibility that in a given period the relative quality
of a network good is reduced. Therefore, our model captures the idea of quality com-
petition in a market facing competitive pressure from within and outside the industry.
Given that competition takes place each period depending on the level of quality of
the good produced by the two firms, which in turn depends on the stochastic R&D
processes, the drivers of industry evolution are the investment incentives of the com-
peting firms. This setup allows us to compare our results with important existing work
on the interplay between R&D and competition.
The model is solved in two steps. In the first step, the product market compe-
tition observed in each period is determined considering the expectation formation
process. For any given quality state (i.e. quality levels of the two firms), the equi-
librium prices and per-period profits are computed, allowing us to see the impact of
network externalities on consumers’ behavior. In the second step, given the outcome
of the product market competition, the fully dynamic investment decision problem is
stated and solved numerically using the methodology developed by Pakes and McGuire
(1994). Equilibrium occurs when the two firms’ expectations about their competitors
strategies are consistent with their actual behavior.
We show four main results. First, the presence of network externalities generates
important incentives to invest in R&D in order to innovate. These investment levels are
higher than the levels that would be observed without network externalities due in part
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to the role of consumer expectations. This result has three important implications: i)
with a positive probability, the traditional result of ”monopolization” in one network
technology can be overcome, resembling the industry evolution of temporary monop-
olists; ii) the threat of losing the market induces the established firm to follow R&D
projects in order to reduce the probability of being overtaken by the challenger; and
iii) the challenger firm has enough incentives to try to overtake the market. These im-
plications are in clear contrast with the current literature that predicts that successful
firms remain as incumbents forever.
Second, for high network effects, a high level of outside competition implies higher
investment levels. This result implies that the relation between innovation incentives
and the level of competition is not an inverted U-shaped function, as traditional in-
novation theory for non-network industries suggests, but it is a monotone increasing
function when network effects are important. This result says that the expectation of
exhibiting future installed bases is so strong, that even considering the case of being a
technological laggard, higher investment levels are, on expectation, worth pursuing. In
addition, this result rationalizes the observed high technological competition in network
industries.
Third, we analyze the incentives to innovate for both firms, we compare the out-
come with the social optimum and investigate the role of the network externalities in
the potential inefficiencies. We find that the market tends to over-invest in R&D in
comparison with the level that maximizes social surplus. This implies that introduction
of new incompatible technologies occurs too often in equilibrium.
And fourth, with high competition outside the industry, the extent of network
externalities is critical in determining the size of the inefficiency associated with the
investment levels. This result shows that in the presence of high outside R&D compe-
tition, the inefficiency associated with the investment level is minimal when network
externalities are not present. As network effects become more important, the ineffi-
ciency is increased monotonically. This results permits to see a clear impact of the role
of network externalities in determining innovation incentives and the associated social
efficiency.
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The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. Section
3 presents the analysis of its equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the main results. Finally,
section 5 concludes and discusses some areas of further research.
3.2 The Model
We present a model of duopoly competition in a market that exhibits network exter-
nalities. Time evolves discretely over an infinite horizon in order to avoid end effects.
Both firms produce with identical marginal costs but potentially different qualities.
Consumers are assumed to be homogeneous in an overlapping generations structure.
3.2.1 Supply Side and R&D Process
There are two firms in the industry producing network goods. Let f ∈ F = {0, 1}
denote the identity of the firms, where 0 represents a firm that lacks an installed base
and 1 represents the firm with an installed base.8 It is assumed that goods produced by
different firms are mutually incompatible. That is, the size of the network associated
with a given firm is equal to the number of users of the good produced by that firm.
For simplicity it is assumed that marginal and fixed costs of production are equal to
zero.9
At any period t, each firm exhibits a given quality embedded in the network good it
produces. This quality level is indexed by i and is independent of the network benefits
that the good may provide. In order to simplify exposition, it is assumed that this level
of quality is relative to an outside technology.10 This assumption serves two purposes.
First, it allows us to focus on a smaller set of possible qualities (i.e. relative qualities),
8As will be explained below, the assumption of homogeneous consumers imply that in each period
only one firm captures the entire market. This fact means that at the beginning of each period, one
firm (f = 1) exhibits an installed base (i.e. captured the market the previous period), while the other
firm has no such base (f = 0).
9A linear demand specification guarantees that this assumption is without loss of generality.
10The outside technology can be thought as a technology that is publicly available to firm f and
is produced in, for example, universities or research facilities. Formally, if the actual quality state of
the technology produced by firm f is i∗ and the outside technology available to this firm is iout, then
i = i∗ − iout.
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and second, it provides an upper limit to the per-period profits of the firms. This latter
condition is required for the existence of the equilibrium. For simplicity, it is further
assumed that the outside technology does not provide any network benefit.
In our duopoly setup, we denote the competitor of firm f and its quality level by
f− and j, respectively. Therefore, a firm in the industry can be fully described by its
state (i, j, f).11 We consider i, j ∈ Q, where Q is the quality space and f ∈ F . For
simplicity, we analyze the case of Q = {1, 2, 3}. That is, there are only three possible
(relative) quality levels that can be exhibited by a firm.12
Qualities evolve stochastically over time. This evolution depends on the firm’s own
costly R&D efforts and on the developments of the outside technology. Specifically,
firm f ’s own technology is improved with a probability that depends positively on
its investments. Let xf denote the investment level on R&D of firm f . We take the
probability that firm f improves its quality to be
xf
1+xf
, while the outside technology is
assumed to be improved each period with probability δ.
Hence, if p(i′|i, xf ) denotes the probability that firm f will have quality i′ in t + 1
given that it has quality i and invests xf in t, we have,
p(i′|i, xf ) =

xf
1+xf
if i′ = i + 1
1
1+xf
if i′ = i
if i = 1,
p(i′|i, xf ) =

(1−δ)xf
1+xf
if i′ = i + 1
1−δ+δxf
1+xf
if i′ = i
δ
1+xf
if i′ = i− 1
if i = 2, and
11Note that (i, j, f) actually describes the state of the industry because for every (i, j, f) there is a
corresponding (j, i, f−). This formulation will allow us to focus on a symmetric equilibrium.
12Note that the actual quality, the numerical value, is not defined yet.
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p(i′|i, xf ) =

1−δ+xf
1+xf
if i′ = i
δ
1+xf
if i′ = i− 1
if i = 3. As can be seen, this formulation implies that a given level of quality
evolves only one step (up or down) from period to period. We now explain the details
of the demand side.
3.2.2 Demand Side and Expectation Formation Process
At any period t, there are two overlapping generations of consumers that live for two
periods. Each period a mass of 1 ”young” consumers arrives into the market and
join a mass of 1 ”old” consumers, so the total population each period is constant and
equal to 2. Consumers are assumed to be homogeneous with an inelastic demand for a
single unit of the network goods offered by the firms. Upon arrival consumers observe
the state of the industry (i.e. they observe (i, j, f) and the corresponding (j, i, f−)),
investments, prices and, then, purchases take place. This process is explained below.
It is important to note that the assumption of homogeneous consumers imply that
in each period only one firm captures the new generation of ”young” consumers. More-
over, once a firm captures the market, it will exhibit an installed base in the next period
because ”old” consumers are locked-in. Therefore, at the beginning of each period there
is one firm with an installed base (i.e. f = 1) and one firm without it (i.e f = 0).
Note that consumers buy a durable network good only once, which amounts to say
that they exhibit prohibitively high switching cost, and therefore, they will be locked-
in in the second period of their lives with the network good that they bought in their
first period. In addition, note that before purchase takes place, consumers observe
the investments undertaken by the competing firms, and thus, the strategic role of the
investment decision is two-fold: i) to affect future quality; and ii) to influence directly
consumers’ expectations about the future installed base.
Importantly, in the presence of network externalities, a consumer decision depends
on how other consumers are deciding. Therefore, consumers must form expectations
Chapter 3 Dynamic R&D Incentives with Network Externalities 64
about other consumers behavior. In our setup, this expectation formation process has
two dimensions. First, consumers arriving in the market in period t must also care
about how the other consumers also arriving in t decide (i.e. my utility is higher, the
more consumers in my own generation choose a compatible good). Second, given that
consumers are locked-in when they are ”old”, consumers arriving in period t must care
about the choice made by the new generation of ”young” consumers arriving in t + 1
(i.e. my utility is higher, the more next generation consumers choose a compatible
good). Moreover, consumers arriving in t care about the choice of consumers arriving
in t + 1, which in turn care about the choice of consumers in t + 2, and so on.
Therefore, in order to calculate demand, the process under which consumers form
expectation must be determined in a way that is consistent with a dynamic equilibrium.
We propose the following two-step expectation formation process. In the first step,
concerning the behavior among individuals of the same generation, we assume that
the consumers behave as ”optimal coordinators”. That is, consumers decide assuming
that all their contemporaries are able to identify and coordinate on the Pareto-optimal
choice.13
In the second step, concerning the expectations on the behavior of future consumers,
we assume that if in a given period the two competing goods exhibit the same quality,
the good provided by the firm with an installed base is preferred. In the case of quality
differences, the good with the higher quality is going to be favored. We assume that
consumers in t follow this rule and expect future consumers to follow it. As will be
shown below, this rule is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
Now that the demand and supply side have been explained, and before we state
formally the product market competition, as well as the firms’ dynamic problem, we
present the time structure. Specifically, at each period t events develop as follows,
• (Relative) quality values are realized
• Firms invest to improve quality
• Prices are determined
13See Katz and Shapiro (1986), and Farrell and Katz (2005).
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• Consumers arrive and observe the current quality state, investments and prices
• Purchases take place
3.2.3 Product Market Competition
In each period, a firm finds itself in state (i, j, f), where i is the (relative to an outside
good) quality state of the good it produces, j is the quality state of the competing firm,
and f is the identity of the firm according to the installed base.14 As we explained
before, consumers are homogeneous implying that only one firm captures the the entire
market each period. We assume that firms are engaged in price (Bertrand) competition
in the product market. Therefore, given our expectation formation process assump-
tions, we calculate the maximum utility that a consumer may enjoy from each of the
two network goods, compare them and derive the corresponding equilibrium demands
and prices.
Specifically, the benefit enjoyed by a generation of consumers arriving in the market
in a given period and buying from the firm with the installed base (f = 1) is given by,
u1i = ai + 2ω + β
[
(1− δ)ai + δai−1
+ ω(1 + 1 · p(i′ > j′|i, j) + 1 · p(i′ = j′|i, j))
]
.
(3.1)
In this expression, the first two terms represent the utility enjoyed by the consumer
in his first period when is ”young”. In particular, ai represents the actual value of the
quality level (given state i) and 2ω represents the network benefits. Recall that the
quality values are relative to an outside option from competition outside the industry.
Moreover, equation (3.1) implicitly says that the outside option is not a network good
from a consumer’s perspective.15
14Again, note that a state (i, j, f) imply that the competitor is in state (j, i, f−).
15This is the case, for example, of free software available on the internet. A consumer deciding to
buy a software, may consider free software as a benchmark of quality without caring too much about
the network benefits it provides.
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Note that the expression presented in equation (3.1) is the utility derived from the
consumption of the good provided by the firm with an installed base. Therefore, in
this case the entire population would be consuming the good from firm f = 1 and the
network benefits is two times the valuation ω of those network benefits (i.e. 2ω).
The third term corresponds to the utility derived in the second period when the
consumer is ”old”, where β is the discount factor. Given that the consumer is locked-in
with his first period choice, in the his second period he will enjoy the same good with
a quality value that depends on the evolution of the outside option. That is, with
probability (1−δ) the outside technology does not advance and therefore he enjoys the
same quality level, while with probability δ that advance takes place and the quality
is reduced.
In terms of the network benefits enjoyed in his second period, it is clear that they
depend on the choice made by the new generation. Therefore, according to our ex-
pectation rule (i.e. better quality firm captures the market or established firm does if
qualities are equal), it can be presented as follows. The network benefits are weighted
by the parameter ω that multiplies: i) the first term represent the network benefits
derived by the fact that the consumer is locked-in in the second period; and ii) it will
enjoy and extra generation if the technology adopted captures the market in the next
period. This occurs with probability p(i′ > j′|i, j)+p(i′ = j′|i, j), where i is the quality
exhibit by firm f = 1 and j is the quality of its competitor in the current period. i′
and j′ represent the quality values in the next period for f = 1 and the competitor
f = 0, respectively.
Analogously, we can describe the utility derived if the given generation of ”young”
consumers decides to purchase from the competing firm f = 0. The interpretation
follows the same lines as in the previous case.
u0j = aj + ω + β
[
(1− δ)aj + δaj−1
+ ω(1 + 1 · p(i′ < j′|i, j) + 1 · p(i′ = j′|i, j))
]
.
(3.2)
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It can be shown that i ≥ j implies that the expression in equation (3.1) is greater
than the one in equation (3.2). This result is important in order to work with an
expectation rule that is dynamically consistent.
Given the homogeneity of the consumers, the demand function for each generation
of ”young” consumers is described as follows. Suppose f represents the firm that
exhibit the installed base and i its quality, then, demand (the identity of the firm the
”young” consumers buy from) as a function of the current state (i, j, f) is given by,
D(i, j, f) =
f if i ≥ jf− if i < j
Under our assumption of Bertrand price competition, equilibrium prices are de-
scribed as follows. Again, suppose f represents the firm that exhibit the installed base
and i its quality,
p*(i, j, f) =

ai + ω + β
[
ai − aj + ω(p(i′ > j′)− p(i′ < j′))
]
if i ≥ j
aj − ω + β
[
aj − ai + ω(p(j′ > i′)− p(j′ < i′))
]
if i < j
Where ai = (1−βδ)(ai−aj)+βδ(ai−1−aj−1) and aj = (1−βδ)(aj−ai)+βδ(aj−1−
ai−1).
Given that each period the mass of new consumers is equal to 1, the per-period prof-
its π(i, j, f) that result from product market competition equal the optimal Bertrand
prices just presented (i.e. p*(i, j, f) = π(i, j, f)). Note that the determination of
p*(i, j, f) implicitly says that firms cannot price below zero. Given that marginal costs
are equal to zero, this would be equivalent to negative mark-ups. However, the case of
possible negative mark-ups is not considered. Even though it could be an interesting
extension, negative mark-ups are associated with predatory pricing which is illegal and
complicates greatly the model.
As can be seen from the price equilibrium expression, the profits obtained in period
t depend on the expected qualities that are going to be realized in period t + 1, which
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in turn depends on the investment decisions by the two firms. Thus, in order to solve
for the product market competition in t, we need to solve the dynamic problem that
determines the distribution of t + 1 qualities (i.e. equilibrium investments). In this
way, we see how equilibrium prices are derived from dynamic incentives due to the role
of investment decisions in affecting consumers choice. In order to do this, we need to
state the dynamic problem using the following Bellman equations.
3.2.4 Dynamic Setup
Let V (i, j, f) denote the expected net present value to firm f when its quality level is
given by i and the quality level by its competitor is given by j. In what follows, we first
characterize the value function V (i, j, f) under the presumption that the firm behaves
optimally. In a second step, we derive the policy function x(i, j, f). Throughout we
take the competitor firm’s investment strategy as given.
The Bellman equation is,
V (i, j, f) = sup
x≥0
[
π(i, j, f)− cx + β
[ ∑
i
∑
j
∑
f
V (i′, j′, f ′)p(f ′)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and c represents the marginal cost of
investment. The Bellman equation adds the firm’s current cash flow π(i, j, f)− cx and
its discounted expected future cash flow.
Importantly, note that given our demand specification, a firm that captures the
market today becomes, unambiguously, the established incumbent tomorrow. There-
fore, for f = 1, i ≥ j implies f ′ = 1 and f ′ = 0, otherwise. Analogously, for f = 0,
i > j implies f ′ = 1 and f ′ = 0, otherwise. This allows us to simplify the Bellman
equations as follows,
V (i, j, 1) = sup
x≥0
[
π(i, j, 1)− cx + β
[ ∑
i
∑
j
V (i′, j′, 1)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
whenever i ≥ j (i.e. a firm with an installed base is able to maintain its dominant
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position).
V (i, j, 1) = sup
x≥0
[
π(i, j, 1)− cx + β
[ ∑
i
∑
j
V (i′, j′, 0)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
if i < j (i.e. the established firm loses its dominance).
V (i, j, 0) = sup
x≥0
[
π(i, j, 0)− cx + β
[ ∑
i
∑
j
V (i′, j′, 1)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
if i > j (i.e. the firm without the installed base captures the market). And finally,
V (i, j, 0) = sup
x≥0
[
π(i, j, 0)− cx + β
[ ∑
i
∑
j
V (i′, j′, 0)p(j′)p(i′)
]]
,
if i ≤ j (i.e. the challenging firm keeps competing without an installed base).
Note that, for a given i′ and f ′, we can define W1(i
′) =
∑
j V (i
′, j′, 1)p(j′) and
W0(i
′) =
∑
j V (i
′, j′, 0)p(j′) as the expected state of the competitor. Thus, the general
expression for the Bellman equation can be written as,
V (i, j, f) = sup
x≥0
[
π(i, j, f)− cx + β
[∑
i
Wf ′(i
′)p(i′)
]]
, (3.3)
where,
f ′ =

1 if f = 1 and i ≥ j
0 if f = 1 and i < j
1 if f = 0 and i > j
0 if f = 0 and i ≤ j
Note that Wf ′(i
′) is the expectation over all possible future states calculated under
the presumption that firm f invests x(i, j, f), and its competitor, firm f−, invests
x(j, i, f−). In addition, Wf ′(i
′) is all that firm f needs to know in order to compete in
the market.
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3.2.5 Investment Strategies
The first-order condition (FOC) for an interior solution is,
∂π(i, j, f)
∂xf
− c + β
∑
i
Wf ′(i
′)
∂p(i′)
∂xf
= 0. (3.4)
for,
f ′ =

1 if f = 1 and i ≥ j
0 if f = 1 and i < j
1 if f = 0 and i > j
0 if f = 0 and i ≤ j
Consider i = 2 as a general case. It can be shown that the second-order condition
is satisfied whenever a solution to equation (3.4) exist. Moreover, the equilibrium
investment level is the maximum between zero and the value of x that solves equation
(3.4).
3.2.6 Equilibrium
As we explained before, given that each firm, and therefore the industry, can be totally
described according to the state (i, j, f), this allows us to focus attention to symmetric
Markov-perfect equilibria (MPE) as defined by Maskin and Tirole (1988). This concept
selects those subgame-perfect equilibria where actions are a function only of pay-off
relevant state variables, and thus eliminates many of the vast multiplicity of subgame-
perfect equilibria that would normally exist in this type of model. Firms maximize their
expected discounted value of profits conditional on their expectations of the evolution
of competition. Equilibrium occurs when the two firms’ expectations are consistent
with the process generated by the optimal policies of their competitors.
Proof that equilibrium exists has been shown in the literature. The proof is omitted
both because it would replicate previous work and because such a proof would be
redundant given that our approach in this chapter is to solve numerically for equilibrium
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once the parameters of the model are defined. In the event that the numerical algorithm
converges, that is sufficient for existence of equilibrium for a specific set of parameters.16
A much greater problem of this kind of models is the potential multiplicity in
the number of equilibria. This is the reason for choosing to focus on a symmetric
equilibrium. That is, two firms that are at identical states are restricted to follow the
same strategies. In our setup, this amounts to say that if firm f is in state (i, j, f), he
expects his competitor f− to behave in the same way as firm f would behave being in
state (j, i, f−). This assumption is standard in the literature of Markov perfect games
and serves also to simplify greatly the computational burden of the model. We also
check the multiplicity of equilibria by allowing the numerical algorithm to start from
different initial conditions. No case was identified where there was more than one
equilibrium.17
3.2.7 Computation
To compute the symmetric MPE, we use a variant of the algorithm described in
Pakes and McGuire (1994). The algorithm works iteratively. It takes a value func-
tion Ṽ (i, j, f) and a policy function x̃(i, j, f) as its input and generates updated value
and policy functions as its output. Each iteration proceeds as follows: First, we use
equation (3.4) to compute a firm f ’s investment strategy x(i, j, f) taking the other
firm’s investment strategy to be given by x̃(j, i, f−). In doing so, we use Ṽ (i, j, f) and
x̃(j, i, f−) to compute Wf ′(i
′). Second, we compute the payoff V (i, j, f) associated with
firm f using x(i, j, f) and Wf ′(i
′). The iteration is completed by assigning V (i, j, f) to
Ṽ (i, j, f) and x(i, j, f) to x̃(i, j, f). The algorithm terminates once the relative change
in the value and the policy functions from one iteration to the next are below a pre-
specified level of tolerance. All programs are written in Matlab 6.5 and are available
upon request.
16Convergence of the numerical algorithm is a sufficient condition for the existence of a ε-equilibrium.
See Benkard (2004).
17Similar approaches to analyze industry evolution are presented in Besanko and Doraszelski (2004),
Benkard (2004), and Doraszelski and Markovich (2005).
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3.2.8 Parametrization
We consider a time period as a year and calculate the discount factor, β, from an
interest rate of approximately 8%. This implies a discount factor of β = 0.925. Even
though the parameter of the marginal cost of investment, c, affects in an important way
the long term behavior of the industry, the qualitative results tend to be maintained.
For simplicity, we assume c = 1.0.
The parameter that measures the probability of exogenous innovation is perhaps
the most influential parameter in our results. Given that no empirical estimation of
this parameter is available for the case of a network industry, the results presented
in this chapter consider δ = 0.1, δ = 0.4 and δ = 0.7. We believe that, as has been
widely highlighted, network goods are based on very fast-paced innovations, the value
of δ = 0.1 is not very realistic. However, in order to present a general analysis the case
of δ = 0.1 is considered, but the focus is on δ = 0.4 and δ = 0.7.
We assume that the values of the qualities are equal to 0, 1 and 2 for the cases of
i equal to 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Given the role of the outside option, it is natural
to normalize to 0 the lower possible relative quality. It is assumed that 0 < ω < 1.
This assumption is important to maintain the consistency of the expectations rules
explained above.
We recognize that the potential relevance of the conclusions provided in this chapter
are still to be corroborated by empirical analysis of network industries.
3.3 Results
In this section we present the results we obtained for our model of duopoly competition
under network externalities and endogenous and stochastic R&D processes. We first
report some results on the incentives to innovate by analyzing the optimal investment
levels exhibited by the two firms. We analyze these results and observe how they depend
on the relevant parameters (i.e. marginal cost of investment, probability of exogenous
innovation and extent of network externalities). Subsequently, given that our industry
is described by a markov chain, we use the well-developed literature on stochastic
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processes to analyze the long term behavior of this industry. By doing this, we are
able to determine the relevance of the investment level observed in each state. Finally,
we compute the social optimum solution (i.e. by consider the monopolist problem and
setting prices equal to zero), compare the results with the market outcome and present
some results on the long run social efficiency of the evolution of the industry.
3.3.1 R&D Incentives
From equations (3.1) and (3.2) can be seen that without network externalities (i.e. ω =
0), the model reduces to a dynamic quality competition with homogeneous consumers.
In that case, any divergence observed in the investment decisions by the two firms
are solely due to differences in their quality levels. We first look at the case without
network externalities and then we compare the results with the case where network
externalities are present (i.e. ω > 0). By doing this, we can develop the main intuition
behind the incentives to invest in R&D as a function of the quality levels. Moreover,
that will allow us to observe more clearly the influence of network externalities on the
R&D incentives of the firms.
Figure 3.1 presents the equilibrium investment levels exhibited by firm f as a func-
tion of its own quality level, the quality of its competitor, the probability of exogenous
outside innovation (i.e. δ) and the marginal cost of investment (i.e. c). Note that in the
absence of network externalities, both firm exhibit a symmetric investment schedule
(i.e. equal states imply equal strategic actions).
This figure highlights two main features of the model that will be important, in
particular the second, in understanding the impact of network externalities. First, the
investment levels are, for any parameter values, decreasing in their marginal costs. The
intuition is straightforward.
Second, the investment levels behave non-monotonically to variations in the level of
the probability of exogenous outside innovation δ. In particular, the investment levels
tend to follow an inverted U-shaped trajectory. Recall that δ represents the potential
exogenous decrease in the firm’s own relative quality level. This implies that the level
of investments inside an industry are related, non-monotonically, to the speed at which
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Figure 3.1: Market Outcome - Investment Levels (ω = 0.0)
the industry evolves.18
The importance of the parameter δ is more clearly seen in Figure 3.2. This figure
shows the investment levels of a firm as a function of its own quality level and that of
its competitor. The left panel shows the case of δ = 0.4. Clearly, with slow outside
technological progress, a firm with a low quality level has a strong incentive to improve
its quality and reap the profits associated with a better product. However, once a high
level of quality is reach, the incentives to keep investment are reduced because the
better quality is more likely to be maintained. It can be shown that these incentives
are reduced in the presence of higher marginal costs of investment.
Analogously, the right panel shows the case of δ = 0.7. In this situation of strong
outside innovation, the relative quality advantages acquired through investments are
very fragile. As a consequence, a firm with a lower quality has low incentives to innovate
because the expected profits associated with the achievement of a quality improvement,
do not compensate the cost involved. As can be seen, a firm that already achieved a
18This result is reminiscent of the inverted U-shape relation between the level of competition in an
industry and the incentives to innovate found in Aghion et. al (2005).
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Figure 3.2: Market Outcome (f = 1) - Investment Levels (ω = 0.0)
high advantage enjoys a dominant position and, therefore, defend that position with
high levels of investment.
In addition, the impact of higher outside competition without network externalities
also implies lower level of investment. According to our choice of parameters, a firm
invests 0.49 on average when is faced by low outside competition represented by δ = 0.4.
On the other hand, for δ = 0.7 suggesting an important outside pressure, the average
investment can be shown to be 0.34.19 Analogously, the impact of higher outside
competition is also reflected in the average per-period profits. These values can be
shown to decline from 0.76 to 0.70 as the outside competition δ is increased from 0.4
to 0.7. As standard IO theory predicts, in the presence of high competition innovation
should decline, as more competition reduces the monopoly rents that reward successful
innovators.20
From Figure 3.2 can also be seen the negative impact that a competitor relatively
quality has on a firm’s investment level. This situation, together with the results for
high levels of outside innovation, δ (i.e. low innovation from low quality firms), suggests
that the industry might be dominated for a long period by a single firm.
19A proper measure of the overall investment level would weight each investment level associated
with a given quality state, by the steady state probability that in the long run the firm is in that
state. This is done in the next subsection.
20See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and also the first generation of Schumpeterian growth models
in Aghion and Howitt (1992), and Caballero and Jaffe (1993). Reinganum (1989) presents a survey
of the literature.
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Impact of network externalities. In particular, we show four main results.
First, in the presence of network externalities, as with the case without them, the
investment levels behave non-monotonically (i.e. inverted U-shaped trajectory) with
respect to the probability of outside innovation. Second, the incentives to innovate are
unambiguously increased by the presence of network externalities. Third, the increase
in the investment levels is not symmetric between the two firms. And fourth, The
overall impact on investments seems to depend on the level of δ. This last result
requires the analysis of the long run performance of the industry and, therefore, is not
analyzed in this subsection.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the first result. These figures present the equilibrium
investment levels exhibited by firm f = 1 and f = 0, respectively, for the case of ω =
0.4. As before, these figures show the equilibrium investment levels as a function of the
firm’s own quality, the quality of the competitor, the probability of exogenous outside
innovation, δ, and the marginal cost of investment, c. The main results hold, namely,
investments are negatively related to marginal costs and non-monotonically (i.e. in an
inverted U-shaped fashion) related to the probability δ of exogenous innovation.
To see in more detail the influence of network externalities, consider Figure 3.5.
This figure shows the level of investment for the two firms for the case of δ = 0.4. As
can be seen, the figures in the diagonal represent states where the quality of both goods
is equal. As expected, for the case of no network externalities (i.e. intersection with
the y-axis) and equal qualities, the incentives to innovate are symmetric for both firms.
Moreover, the figure shows the second result highlighted above. That is, investments
increase as the network externalities become more important. This result highlights a
feature frequently observed in network industries, namely, the high R&D competition
as a mean to maintain an installed base.
Interestingly, note that for cases when the quality states is (2, 3) or (3, 2) the curves
of the investment levels of the two firm intersect each other. Moreover, according to
our assumptions on the demand side, a firm with a higher quality captures the market.
These two figures show that with a moderate outside competition (δ = 0.4) and high
network effects, the winning firm may invest very aggressively in order to protect its
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Figure 3.3: Market Outcome (f = 1) - Investment Levels (ω = 0.4)
Figure 3.4: Market Outcome (f = 0) - Investment Levels (ω = 0.4)
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Figure 3.5: Market Outcome - Investment Levels (δ = 0.4)
installed base. This situation does not hold with ω = 0 and highlights the role of the
expected future installed base in determining current R&D incentives.21
In can also be seen from the picture that the impact of network externalities affects
firms in an asymmetric way. This highlights our third result. This suggests that, in
the presence of network externalities, the expectation of potential gains for being the
winning firm and exhibit an installed base, impacts positively the incentives to innovate
of both firms. However, the expected gains tend to be higher for the firm that currently
exhibits an installed base and, therefore, is that firm the one that invests more in R&D.
Finally, the fourth result states that the expected overall level of investment de-
pends on the level of outside competition faced by the two firms. This point will be
treated in the next subsection but, essentially, it shows that for high network effects
the expected investment levels tend to reverse the nature of the impact of high outside
competition that is observed without network externalities (i.e. the inverse U-shaped
21It should be notice that when the outside competition is fierce (i.e. δ = 0.7) the two curves do
not intersect anymore. However, the case presented shows a situation when the presence of important
network benefits affect in an important way the incentives to innovate.
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relation between the incentives to innovate and the level of competition).
Here we have shown that the optimal investment level of a given firm decreases with
the cost of investment and with the investment level of the competitor. In addition, for
high values of the exogenous advance (i.e. δ), investment levels tend to be concentrated
on the high quality states. Conversely, for low values of δ, investments tend to be
concentrated on low quality states. Network externalities tend to impact positively
the levels of investment, but the effect between firms is asymmetric (i.e. related to
the presence of installed bases). However, the long run impact depends on the relative
importance of each state. This is analyzed in the next subsection when the equilibrium
long term probability distribution of the quality states is calculated.
3.3.2 Industry Dynamics
Given that the investment levels determine the probability of reaching a higher quality
level, they impact decisively the long term performance of the industry in a markov
fashion. In order to see this, we compute the transient and the limiting distribution of
the stochastic process associated with the evolution of the industry.
Given an initial state, the transient distribution determines the probability of being
in any other state after a prespecified number of periods. This distribution is defined
as follows. For M possible states, let P be the M2 × M2 transition matrix of the
markov process of industry evolution that can be computed using the equilibrium
investment levels. Then, the marginal (transient) distribution after T periods is given
by a(T ) = a(0)P T , where a(0) is the 1×M2 initial distribution.
In addition, the limiting distribution describes the steady state behavior of the
industry. It shows the invariant probability that, for any initial state, in the long run
a firm will find itself in any particular state and is defined as follows. The 1 × M2
limiting distribution π, is the distribution that solves the system of linear equations
π = Pπ, where P is the M2 ×M2 equilibrium transition matrix.
In our model, the transition to the steady state is very fast. That is, after a few
number of period the transient distribution is equal to the limiting distribution. This
situation can be due to the fact that in the model, the firm with a better quality
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Figure 3.6: Limiting Distribution - ω = 0.0 and δ = 0.4
captures the entire market in only one period and there are only 3 different quality
levels. However, the values of the limiting distribution depend on the initial conditions
considered. As presented before, for low probability of exogenous innovation (i.e. low
δ) investments tend to be concentrated in low quality states. Conversely, for high
values of δ, investments tend to be concentrated in low quality states.
Let’s consider δ = 0.4 as a baseline. In the steady state, independent of the starting
point of the industry, the limiting distribution represents the probability of being on a
given state.
We briefly present the limiting distribution for the case of no network externalities
(i.e. ω = 0) as a benchmark for comparison. This distribution is presented in Figure
3.6. Form this figure two results can be deduced concerning the long term behavior
of the industry. We denote the possible states by (i, j) and (j, i) for a firm and its
competitor, respectively. Recall that the identity of the firm in the absence of network
externalities is irrelevant.
First, the most likely states are those with the highest quality differentiation. That
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is, states (3, 1) and (1, 3). The mechanism behind this result can be described as fol-
lows. Given that the only source of differentiation between the two firms is the quality
level, higher quality provides a higher profit only if the competitor exhibit a lower
quality, otherwise price competition drives industry profits to zero. Therefore, once a
state with asymmetric quality levels is reached, the firm with the higher quality has
strong incentive to improve or maintain its quality advantage. On the other hand, the
firm with the lower quality exhibit fewer incentives to innovate because reaching the
competitor’s high quality is a costly process that will provide zero profits if successful.
As a consequence, the most likely states to be observed are those where quality differ-
entiation is maximal. As Figure 3.6 shows, the state (3, 1) is reached in the long run
with probability 0.20. State (1, 3) exhibit the same probability given the symmetry
obtained in the absence of network externalities.
Second, even though the states with maximal quality differentiation are those with
the higher probability in the long run, other states are also highly probable. This is
a result of the firm’s idiosyncratic shocks introduced in the model (i.e. probability of
exogenous innovation, δ). That feature of the model implies that a firm with the highest
quality level does not sustain that leading position indefinitely. As a consequence,
competitors perceive a profit opportunity and compete for it. In the case of no network
externalities this is a smooth process. In particular, with probability 0.14 a state (2,1) is
reached. It can be shown that when this state is reached, the low quality firm increases
its investment level. Thus, a symmetric state (2,2) is reached with a probability of 0.09
which may lead the former low quality firm to be the next industry leader. That is, to
reach state (1, 3).
Figure 3.7 presents the limiting distribution when the network externalities are
low. That is, it shows the case for ω = 0.2. This figure highlights the role of network
externalities in industry dynamics and presents three main results. These results are
compared with the findings reported above for the case of no network externalities.
We define a state according to the notation (i, j, f) given the relevance of the identity
of the firms.
First, as in the case without network externalities, the most likely states in the long
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Figure 3.7: Limiting Distribution - ω = 0.2 and δ = 0.4
term equilibrium are those with the highest level of quality differentiation. In essence,
this result follows the same argument as in the case with ω = 0 and is a consequence
of quality competition. However, the presence of network externalities implies that the
identity of the firm plays an important role. That is, (3, 1, 1) 6= (1, 3, 0). These states
are reached with a probability of 0.32 and 0.10, respectively.
Second, not only the results are now asymmetric due to the presence of network
externalities. The probability for a firm of being an established incumbent with the
highest possible quality advantage (i.e. state (3, 1, 1)), 0.32, implies that with net-
work externalities a dominant position is more likely to be sustained. This is not a
surprising result given the advantage provided by the installed base and the effect on
consumer expectations.22 However, the model also suggests that this predominance of
an established incumbent is not a permanent phenomenon and this lead us to our third
result.
Third, even though the industry tend to be dominated by an established incumbent,
22Recall that in making consumption decisions, consumers expect a higher surplus from the firm
with an installed base in the case of equal quality levels.
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Figure 3.8: Limiting Distribution - ω = 0.8 and δ = 0.4
this is not a permanent result. This represents a contrast with the current literature on
the evolution of network industries. Moreover, the process of a new leader overtaking
the market is not as smooth as the case without network externalities.
Finally, we can briefly consider the same analysis just presented, but taking into
account a more important role of the network externalities parameter. Figure 3.8 shows
the limiting distribution for ω = 0.8
The qualitative results for the case of ω = 0.8 are similar to those presented for the
case of ω = 0.2. However, if the importance of the network externalities is increased,
the possibility of a new leader in the industry overtaking the market if more likely. As
presented before, network externalities provide an incentive to firms to increment their
investment and attempt to capture the market and become an established incumbent
with the benefits of an installed base. This incentive has an impact on the level of
investment of a firm with a low quality level. This incentive is not present in the case
without network externalities, and even, when the parameter that measures the extent
of the network effects is low.
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ω = 0.0 ω = 0.2 ω = 0.8
δ = 0.1
E(π(i, j, f)) 1.38 1.39 1.48
E(x(i, j, f)) 0.28 0.24 0.30
E(V (i, j, f)) 10.97 8.42 9.57
δ = 0.4
E(π(i, j, f)) 2.05 1.98 2.32
E(x(i, j, f)) 1.00 0.71 0.81
E(V (i, j, f)) 10.50 9.22 11.84
δ = 0.7
E(π(i, j, f)) 0.88 1.12 1.94
E(x(i, j, f)) 0.61 0.52 0.86
E(V (i, j, f)) 1.33 3.32 7.04
Table 3.1: Industry Performance - Market Outcome
In addition, is important to see what is the impact of the quantitative difference
that are obtained given the variation of the parameters of interest. We show this
analysis in the following subsection.
3.3.3 Industry Performance
Having computed the limiting distribution of the industry evolution, we can using it to
calculate the steady state expected per-period profits (π(i, j, f)), the levels of invest-
ment (x(i, j, f)) and the overall discount profits observed in the industry (V (i, j, f)).
Table 3.1 presents some of these results, considering different values of the parameter
of interest.
In particular, the expected per-period profits are non-monotonic in the behavior
of the probability of exogenous innovation δ. That is, low and high values of δ are
associated with a low level of profits. On the contrary, moderate levels of the probability
of exogenous innovation tend to boost profits. This result suggest that for too low
pressure outside the two firms, the cost associated with innovating in R&D are not
compensated by the increase in expected profits. The reason is that under low external
Chapter 3 Dynamic R&D Incentives with Network Externalities 85
competition, a dominant position is achieved with less intensity in R&D. Analogously,
under very high external competition, it is too costly to maintain a dominant position
and therefore the most profitable states are less likely to be reached.
The expected investment level shows a similar pattern non-monotone as the one
observed for the per-period profits with respect to the probability δ of exogenous in-
novation (i.e. inverted U-shaped behavior). Under too low or too high external com-
petition the benefits associated to invest in R&D do not compensate the cost of it (see
discussion below). However, as the last column of Table 3.1 shows, this situation can
be reversed for very high network effects. This result may appear counterintuitive. As
stated before, high levels of δ imply that the quality loses some of its value in a relatively
frequent manner. Therefore, a firm cannot maintain its advantage indefinitely, there
is less possibility of preempt a competitor and incentives to innovate should decline.
For high network effects, preemption becomes more feasible and this may increase the
incentives to innovate. We extend this result in the Discussion section.
3.3.4 Social Planner
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to analyze the social efficiency of the
private incentives to innovate. In order to do this, we solve for the social planner
problem. This is done by considering the case of a monopolist in charge of the two
technologies (i.e. network goods) and that prices equal to marginal cost (i.e. zero
and therefore maximizing consumer surplus which is equal to social surplus in our
homogeneous consumer framework presented in equations (3.1) and (3.2)).
The main result obtained by analyzing the problem of the social planner is that
there is too much R&D in the industry. The main implication of this result is that
there is too much introduction of improved goods in the market. In particular, Figure
3.9 shows the socially optimal level of investments for δ = 0.4.
Given that the social planner internalizes the costs associated with the quality
improvements, it tends to concentrate investment in the firm that exhibits a quality
advantage. This result implies that a technology that exhibits a better quality tend
to stay as the preferred technology because it maximizes the network benefits enjoyed
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Figure 3.9: Social Planner - Investment Levels (δ = 0.4)
by the population. As a consequence, this result also shows that the market outcome
induces too much introduction of new incompatible technologies.
Figure 3.10 shows the extent of the inefficiency exhibited by the firm with the
installed base, while Figure 3.11 presents the case of the firm that lacks the installed
base. These figures explicitly show that in the presence of network externalities, firms
competition tend to generate an over-investment behavior in comparison with the social
optimum. Moreover, the inefficiency is greater, the greater the network effects.
Table 3.2 presents some results for the social planner’s problem that can be com-
pared with the results presented in Table 3.1. In particular, it presents two important
results. First, high levels of δ reduce the expected social surplus and also reduce the
expected investment levels. And second, it states that with high competition outside
the industry (high δ), the extent of network externalities is critical in determining the
size of the inefficiency associated with the investment levels (see discussion below).
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Figure 3.10: Efficiency - Investment Levels for f = 1 (δ = 0.4)
Figure 3.11: Efficiency - Investment Levels for f = 0 (δ = 0.4)
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ω = 0.0 ω = 0.2 ω = 0.8
δ = 0.4
E(π(i, j, f)) 4.44 3.01 5.20
E(x(i, j, f)) 0.76 0.55 0.63
Inefficiency on x 0.31 0.25 0.38
δ = 0.7
E(π(i, j, f)) 1.66 1.75 3.76
E(x(i, j, f)) 0.53 0.38 0.46
Inefficiency on x 0.08 0.13 0.43
Table 3.2: Industry Performance - Social Planner
3.4 Discussion
The previous section presented the general results of our model. In this section we
highlight the results that provide the most interesting comparison with the economic
literature and discuss their relevance. We focus the discussion around three main
results. First, in the presence of high outside competition, the model predicts a high
expected level of investment when the extent of network externalities is high. Second,
for any parameter configuration, the expected steady state investment levels are socially
inefficient in the sense that is above the value that maximizes social surplus. And
third, with high competition outside the industry, the extent of network externalities
are critical on determining the size of the inefficiency associated with the investment
levels.
The first result shows that in the presence of high network effects (ω), the expected
level of investment is increasing in the level of competition (δ). In order to show the
importance of this result, we need some insights from the literature on innovation and
its approach on the interaction of the level of competition and market innovation.
Specifically, the Schumpeterian approach to market innovation states that in the
event of an increase in competition, firms tend to reduce their innovation levels because
higher competition dissipates some of the rents associated with higher market power
(i.e. lower competition). This has been termed the ”Schumpeterian effect”. However,
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it has been empirically shown that in some cases the relation is positive.23
This case of direct relation between the level of competition and the incentives to
innovate is partially consistent with the Schumpeterian view. This is so, because in the
presence of a positive relation between the level of competition and market innovation,
the expected rents from innovating are reduced by the presence of higher competition
as the Schumpeterian view sustain. However, higher competition may imply higher
innovation if the rents from not innovating are much lower (i.e. even though under
higher competition innovation is less profitable, is better than not innovating). This
has been termed the ”escape effect”.
In general terms, the two effects have been made compatible by Aghion et al. (1997)
and Aghion et al. (2001). In particular, the level of innovation behaves as an inverted
U-shape function in relation to the level of competition.24 That is, for low levels of
competition, the investment level tend to increase as competition become fiercer (i.e.
escape effect) and, eventually, starts declining in the presence of high competition (i.e.
Schumpeterian effect). As shown in the previous section, this is exactly the behavior
of the level of innovation without network externalities (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1).
Surprisingly, as the first result considered in this discussion states, for high network
effects (ω), high level of competition (δ) implies higher investment levels (as shown
in Table 3.1). In other words, the escape effect dominates the Schumpeterian effect
and the relation between innovation incentives and the level of competition is not an
U-shaped function but a monotone increasing function. This result says that the ex-
pectation of exhibiting future installed bases is so strong, that even considering the case
of being a technological laggard, higher innovation are, on expectation, worth pursu-
ing. In addition, this result rationalizes the observed high technological competition in
network industries.
The second result is in line with the current literature on technological innovation
in network industries. The result states that for any parameter configuration, the
expected steady state investment levels are socially inefficient in the sense that they
23See Geroski (1995), Nickell (1996) and Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999).
24This theoretical finding is in line with the empirical results of Scherer (1967), Levin et al. (1985)
and is specifically tested in Aghion et al. (2005).
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are above the value that maximizes social surplus. In particular, although the presence
of installed bases tend to suggest that inefficient technologies might capture the market
for a (socially too) long period of time, our model suggests the opposite. That is, there
is too much investment in comparison with the level that would maximize social surplus
and, in consequence, there is too much quality improvement in the market.
Moreover, Katz and Shapiro (1992, 1994) also argue in favor of too much innovation
in network markets and state that in contrast to the common presumption that these
markets tend to be biased in favor of existing product, there is actually a tendency
to rush on new incompatible technologies. In that sense, our results are consistent
with the current literature on innovation in network markets. However, our results are
derived from a fully dynamic setup with endogenous and stochastic R&D incentives.
The third result states that with high competition outside the industry, the extent
of network externalities is critical in determining the size of the inefficiency associated
with the investment levels. This result shows that in the presence of high outside
competition (high δ), the inefficiency associated with the investment level is minimal
when network externalities are not present. As network effects become more important,
the inefficiency is increased monotonically (see Table 3.2).
This result is important because it permits to see a clear impact of the role of
network externalities in determining innovation incentives and the associated social
efficiency. Moreover, this result implies that in order to pursue a correct public policy,
it is necessary to know the extent of network externalities. Otherwise, a measure that
attempts to correct an inefficiency in the levels of innovation, and therefore in the
process of adoption of new technologies, may imply a higher costs that the potential
benefits it was intended to provide.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a dynamic model of quality competition in the presence of
network externalities that adapts the Markov-perfect equilibrium framework presented
in Ericson and Pakes (1995). Incentives to invest in R&D are derived endogenously.
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The focus of this chapter was twofold. First, to see the impact of network externalities
in the incentives to innovate in a fully dynamic framework. And second, the analysis of
the social efficiency of the R&D levels predicted by the market outcome. The robustness
of the presented results with respect to the assumed functional forms is the objective
of current work.
We showed four main results. First, the presence of network externalities generates
important incentives to invest in R&D in order to innovate. This investment levels
are higher than the levels that would be observed without network externalities. This
result has three important implications: i) with a positive probability, the traditional
result of ”monopolization” in one network technology can be overcome, resembling the
industry evolution of temporary monopolists; ii) the threat of losing the market induces
the established firm to follow R&D projects in order to reduce the probability of being
overtaken by the challenger; and iii) the challenger firm has enough incentives to try
to overtake the market. These results are in clear contrast with the current literature
that predicts that successful firms remain as incumbents forever.
Second, for high network effects, a high level of outside competition implies higher
investment levels. This result implies that the relation between innovation incentives
and the level of competition is not an U-shaped function, as traditional innovation
theory for non-network industries suggests, but is a monotone increasing function.
This result says that the expectation of exhibiting future installed bases is so strong,
that even considering the case of being a technological laggard, higher investment levels
are, on expectation, worth pursuing. In addition, this result rationalizes the observed
high technological competition in network industries.
Third, we analyze the incentives to innovate for both firms, we compare it to the
social optimum and investigate the role of the network externalities. We find that the
market tends to over-invest in R&D in comparison with the level that maximizes social
surplus. This implies that introduction of new incompatible technologies occurs too
often in equilibrium.
And fourth, with high competition outside the industry, the extent of network
externalities is critical in determining the size of the inefficiency associated with the
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investment levels. This result shows that in the presence of high outside R&D compe-
tition, the inefficiency associated with the investment level is minimal when network
externalities are not present. As network effects become more important, the ineffi-
ciency is increased monotonically. This result permits to see a clear impact of the role
of network externalities in determining innovation incentives and the associated social
efficiency.
We recognize several areas of further research in the area of R&D incentives in the
presence of network externalities. A deeper analysis of the different ways about how
consumers form expectations (or coordinate) may provide new insights on the interplay
between R&D incentives in network industries. That is the subject of current research.
In addition, the analysis of compatibility decisions must also be considered given its
obvious relevance in these industries but for the time being beyond the scope of the
present chapter.
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